DEMOCRATIZATION IN PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE NAWAZ ERA (2013 - 2018)

Abstract

The purpose of this study is democratization during PML-N government (2013 to 2018) and investigate the factors that either strengthened or weakened the democratic institutions, such as parliament, executive (civilian supremacy), judiciary and media. A large number of observers and participants believe that the advent of democracy has been the most significant development in international politics during the past decade. To yet, Pakistan has not learned too much about democracy. Several multi-party systems, civilian rule, and the use of elections to change governments have all made a comeback in modern Pakistan. This has resulted in a revitalised and fiercely competitive political culture. Recent research has demonstrated a strong link between democratisation and political system. According to the study, democracy is complete if the number of years under democratic rule continues to rise. When democracy was reinstated as the primary framework of Pakistan's political system, it brought up a number of contentious concerns. There is hope for a more democratic political system in Pakistan. Elections that are free, fair, and transparent help to fortify a country's democratic norms and institutions. Since 2008, Pakistan has hosted two elections (2013, 2018), in which power has been smoothly passed from one civilian administration to another. However, electoral reform has been at the centre of controversial arguments in Pakistan in recent years. The role that foreign influence plays in the democratisation process is complex, ranging from overt pressure on the issue of democracy to the concealment of entrenched interests.

Table of Contents

4

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Democratization, a process through which political regimes become democratic. It maybe from authoritarian regime to semi authoritarian or from semi authoritarian to democratic political system. Mostly in third world countries, military generally interferes in politics, it is also the case in Pakistan. The military ruled over the country for 35 years and did not improve political norms. In August 2008, Musharraf resigned from as president of Pakistan. It was a big development towards a new democratic political period in the history of Pakistan. During Musharraf's term of 9 years, He improved economic conditions, during his administration, electronic media flourished, political participation which was increased in the last year of governance (Shafqat, 2009).

Political parties were satisfied from the result of 2008 election because there was no political rigging like previous governments. General election of 2008 was regarded as a breakthrough for democracy in Pakistan in general elections, Pakistan people's party parliamentarian (PPPP) won 119 out of 342 seats in national assembly and it emerged as the single largest party I n the national assembly. It formed a coalition government in the center and provinces. After Syed Yousef Raza

Gilani become the prime minster and Asif Raza Ali Zardari is a president after resignation by Musharraf.

PPP was able to create consensus among all political parties and government of from parties to need on an agreement on 17the national finance award (NFC) in 2010.It also formulated a parliamentary committee to restore the 1973 constitution and parliamentary form of the government. the parliament were empowered and measures were taken for the civilian supremacy and making executive accountable before the parliament. the judges deposed by Pervez Musharraf

were restored and independence judiciary played proactive role. Meanwhile, media enjoyed significant independence and played vibrant role in strengthen democratic norms in the country.

PPP was cable to couple its five years term despite several challenges, it was the first in the history of Pakistan that a civilian government completed its term and power was handed over to new elected government in the country.

After General elections 2018, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif emerged the victories party and it formed government in the center and Punjab .in Baluchistan it formed a coalition government with nationalist parties, in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP),PPPP and Pakistan Tehreek-I-Insaf (PTI) formed the government .PML-N government faced various challenges from the onset such as terrorism ,poor economy , energy crisis, electricity and gas shortages leadership, law and order situation in the country especially Karachi .moreover, strengthening of democratic political institutions and steering the country further away from the adverse effects the military rule were the

6

daunting challenges for the government .PML-N government also to face an hostile opposition that was not only bent upon to topple it down but also challenged its legitimacy .these situation ad for reaching complications for the processes of strengthening political institution in the country.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

After 9 years military rule under General Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2018, Pakistan moved towards democratic rule in the government of PPP. During its rule PPP government took several steps to strength democratic processes, however, transition from dictatorship to democracy is always a challenging task and involves a long process. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that a democratic government completed its tenure of five years, followed by free and fair

elections. After 2013 general elections (PMLN) led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif formed the government. The new government strived to continue to the process of strengthening democratic institutions. However, it also faced various challenges in this period. This study focuses on the developments and steps taken for strengthening democratic institutions and challenges it faced during the process.

1.3 Significance of the Study

The proposed study is significant it to focuses on the processes of democratization and challenges to the democratic institutions in Pakistan during the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif between 2013 to 2018.It will be helpful for the academician's students and scholars to identify the problems and challenges to the process of strengthening democratic institutions of Pakistan.

1.4 Research Objectives

- To evaluate the processes of democratization during PML-N government (2013 to 2018)
- To investigate the factors that either strengthened or weakened the democratic institutions, such as parliament, executive (civilian supremacy), judiciary and media.

1.5 Research Questions

1. What were the factors that either strengthened or weakened the political institutions such as parliament, executive, judiciary and media during PML-N government (2013 to 2018)?
2. How did different political developments affect the processes of democratization from 2013 to 2018?

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Pakistan: Transition to Democracy? by the International Crisis Group. elucidated the time period of Musharraf's administration. This report examines Pakistan under military control and then details the transition from autocracy to democracy under military authority. (ICRC,2002) By instituting the devolution plan to devolve power from the centre to the periphery, Musharraf has taken steps toward democratising society. The plan's goal was to put people's rights right at their fingertips, hence a hierarchical system of power was developed. Zilla Nazim-e-Alaa (District Chief) was at the top of the chain, followed by Tehsil Nazim, the Municipal Committee, and finally the village council. The Musharraf administration established new agencies, such the National Security Council, to improve bureaucratic performance (NSC). NSC was established in 2004 as a federal entity to aid the government in dialogue. The NSC, made up of the state's security

specialists and cabinet members, was tasked with discussing the country's foreign policy and national security. Additionally, the Musharraf administration attempted to change the constitution by unconstitutional means. One such method was the use of a Provisional Constitutional Measure (PCO), which is an emergency order that temporarily or permanently overrides the state's constitution. In light of this, practically all chief justices and other top judges were compelled to take an oath of office under PCO, calling into doubt the separation of powers of the court. In this study, we attempt to do just that, by analysing each new development as it has occurred (Ahmad, 2015).

The first democratically elected government in Pakistan has completed its five-year term, as detailed in "Discovering Democracy: Five Years of Political Rule in Pakistan" by Ayesha Siddiq. What this signifies is that the country is making the transition to democracy (Siddiqa, 2013) In their paper, "Research Paper of Democratic Political Development," Gulam Zakaria and Dr. Gulam Ahmad argue that a country can advance its progress toward development by strengthening its institutions, bolstering its national integrity, democratising its government, and expanding its citizens' opportunities to take part in politics. However, due to military coups in Pakistan, this idea could not be maintained. During 2008–2013, several events occurred that ran counter to earlier political shifts. The development of a democratic political system in the country can be attributed to a number of factors, including the holding of frequent elections, the formation of a coalition government, political cooperation between the opposition and the government on matters of national importance, an increase in political participation, a robust media, the reinstatement of a democratic constitution and an abundance of legislation, and

9

judicial activism aimed at reestablishing the constitutional independence of the judiciary (Zakaria & Ahmad, 2019).

The authoritarian structure also offers elected bodies for legislation, but it does not grant authority to institutions and the individuals holding significant positions in them, as Muhammad Ibrahim pointed out in his paper Democratization in South Asia: A Case Study of India and Pakistan (1988-1999). In both India and Pakistan, the question of how to establish and maintain institutions that promote democracy and citizen participation in government is of paramount importance. Currently, the democratic system enjoys the widest support and favorability among people throughout the globe. It has the potential to rationally incorporate the demands of the broadest possible range of constituents into the legislative process (Ibrahim, 2013).

Four times over its history, Pakistan's parliamentary system collapsed under the weight of tyranny, and the military was forced to do unlawful acts due to the immaturity of the country's political leaders. PPP has been elected to power four times and has maintained its status as Pakistan's most popular political organisation. In the 2008 election that followed Benazir's murder, the Bhutto party came out on top and formed a coalition government. It was the first time in Pakistan's history that a democratic administration served its full term, and it was marked by the government's adoption of a policy of reconciliation and the revival of the constitution in its original form. During its tenure, it managed to get three major changes and a bill to empower women into law. The PPP government has restored the constitution to its original form and pursued a policy of reconciliation (Mustafa, Javed, & Arslan, 2019).

10

Pakistan established a federal democratic system with a parliamentary kind of administration, as explained by the author in Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan: An study of PPP Government (2008-2013) (Khan, 2021). However, Pakistan's political past shows a departure from parliamentary democracy and the least attention towards institutionalising its political system. The democratic progress of Pakistan has always been hampered by the country's penchant for authoritarianism, military rule, and lopsided civil-military relations. Power shifted from the military to the citizens after the elections of 2008. After taking office, the Pakistan People's Party implemented the historic 18th constitutional amendment to return the country's constitution to its pre-Amendment 1973 form. It reaffirmed parliamentary rule and reexamined federalism by granting provinces full power and doing away with the concurrent list. The electoral commission of Pakistan has been made more open and the courts more autonomous. The author also examines the PPP-led government's (2008-2013) role in establishing a sustainable federal democratic system based on participatory governance, as well as the political and constitutional development that occurred during that time.

Pakistan's democratic institutions are made stronger by the constitution's established norms. The political and democratic trends in Pakistan were set by the policies of the 2008 regime. With the adoption of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 1973, Pakistan has taken a significant step towards establishing a more robust constitutional order and a more robust democracy. Judicial preeminence, rule of law, parliamentary preeminence, strengthened federalism, and constitutional stability result from the adoption of new amendments. The problems surfaced after the system had been put into place.

11

Infrastructure and electricity shortages might be exacerbated by the ongoing dispute resolution among the federating units. It will take some time and patience to figure out. Pakistan's political system will benefit from these qualities following discussion. All parts of society will benefit from the system's operation. Consistency, conformity, and respect for constitutional rules and institutional limits are essential for this. Constraining political leadership and close cooperation between central provincial governments and federal institutions, both of which are essential to preserving the new constitutional order, is counterproductive (Abdullah, 2017).

According to the article "What Is Democracy? Democracy, the author of "Challenges for Democracy in Pakistan" said, is a well-known type of governance in the modern political world. Free and fair elections, an independent media, an independent education system, an independent judiciary, independent political parties, religious tolerance, etc. are all hallmarks of a genuine democracy. Since its independence, Pakistan has been led by both authoritarian and democratic governments. Pakistan has had a number of democratic administrations, but its leaders have always failed to deliver on the most fundamental needs of the population. Key obstacles to the achievement of democracy include a lack of timely, free, and fair elections, a divide between political elite and people, martial-laws, civil-military interactions, and a lack of education and awareness among the general population. Thus, it is also vital to enhance these instruments for the development of democracy in Pakistan. (Bib, 2018).

3. RESEARCH METHHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

This study uses Qualitative research methodology and thematic analysis the challenges in order comprehend challenges to democracy during Nawaz Government (2013-2018).

3.2 Data Collection

The researcher was collected data from primary and secondary sources. The researcher was utilized secondary sources such as books, article, and research reports published by reliable resources. For primary sources the researcher get helps from official documents, speeches, interviews of national leader's politicians and government officials etc. The researcher will also conduct semi-structured interviews of selected political leaders, political analysts' academicians and researchers etc.

3.3 Operational definition of key concepts

3.3.1 Democracy

In a democracy, citizens vote for their representatives and make policy decisions for the nation as a whole.

3.3.2 Democratisation

The process of moving toward a more democratic political system, as well as making significant political reforms in that direction, is known as democratisation.

3.3.3 Dictatorship

The term "dictatorship" refers to a political system in which one person or a

13

small number of people exercise absolute control over the nation's institutions and citizens. A dictator is the name given to the head of a totalitarian regime.

3.3.4 Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is a political system that reduces the rule of law, the separation of powers, as well as democratic voting in favour of strong central control to maintain the political status quo.

3.3.5 Hydrid Regime

A hybrid regime is a sort of political system that features elements of both an authoritarian and a democratic government. Hybrid regimes are characterised by the presence of both authoritarian and democratic tendencies, including the ability to conduct both political repression as well as regular elections.

3.3.6 Political culture

The term "political culture" refers to the study of the cultural influences on government. There is a distinct political culture at the heart of every political system.

3.3.7 Political institutions

The term "political institutions" is used to describe the many governing entities, such as presidents, legislatures, and parties, that make up the contemporary system of government. Institutions of government focus on balancing the power structure of a society. Understanding political institutions requires a firm grasp of authority and power.

14

CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRATIZATION

2.1 Introduction

Democratization should be understood as a process leading to increased democracy that is not only concerned on political transitional phases but also on possible governmental stages of social and economic change to ensure bias is avoided. In order to consolidate a democratic administration, there has to be a historic compromise between the major political actors and the social forces. If the Democratization process is seen in the context of a political system with established and firm beliefs, it is quite rocky. When classified in terms of its actual consequences, the rocky process of democratisation may be seen (Harland, 2022).

After a non-democratic system has fallen, the process of establishing a democracy is referred to as "democratisation" (Sodaro, 2001). In essence, it is a process of changing from one type of government to another. A consolidated democracy is any democracy with free and fair elections, no monopolies, and safeguarded citizen rights. The relationship between parliament and democracy is similar to the collaboration between various institutions that makes the journey toward democratisation easier. A constitution that does not reflect public expectations cannot be the cornerstone of democratic government (Mehmood,

15

Pakistan Political Roots & Development 1947-1999, 2000). In "A Democratic Government," Lord Bryce argues that the power to govern does not belong to any one class but rather to society as a whole because of the feeling of collectively, which implies that society as a whole decides on issues pertaining to the welfare of the public.

The goal of democratisation is the abolition of all non-democratic regimes and the avoidance of any official interference that subverts citizen rights. In many nations across the world, the process of democratisation is still underway, although a variety of circumstances affect its outcome. The goal of the democratic consolidation process is to maintain democracy for the long term while addressing any potential difficulties (Sodaro, 2001). In this process, the public's endorsement of democratic values and norms is crucial. Ultimately, nothing will succeed if the population does not embrace democratisation. This process of consolidating democracy is troubled by a number of independent and dependent variables. Many academics argue that democratisation characterised by two to three democratic characteristics, such as free and fair elections, would eventually result in consolidated democracy (Sodaro, 2001).

It seems appropriate to analyse these two factors in depth individually before going into the specifics of developing the conceptual framework on the function of political leadership and using it to the process of democratisation of Pakistan (Taj, 2020). First and foremost, the investigator has made an attempt to conceptualise the concepts of a leader and leadership as well as to identify the fundamentals of

16

political leadership, including its abilities, traits, models, theories, and methods all of which continue to be the study's key focuses. The significance and dynamism of the democratisation process will also be anticipated, since this is a key component of study on the Pakistani democracy process. The existence of democracy in diverse cultures is influenced by a number of characteristics that have been determined by various academics. The factors that will be explored come from the writings of several authors and academics. These elements were obtained by these authors and academics from a number of democratising nations. According to their viewpoints, the fundamental elements that made up the requirements for democratisation aid in comprehending the position, setting, mentality, and practical function of leadership in achieving democratisation (Owais, 2020).

Transitioning to a more democratic political system is the democraticization process. It can be the change from an oppressive to a partially democratic one. According to Francis Fukuyama, (2006) the advent of liberal democracy is the last remaining form of human administration in his book "The End of History and the Last Man."

In "The Third Wave," Samuel P. Huntington (2012) discusses the post-World War II trend toward worldwide democracy. The variables that influence, facilitate, or impede the democracy process, of which leadership is one, are hotly contested. S.P. Huntington stressed the part played by leaders in enacting change and serving as a catalyst for the shift to a democratic system. According to what he wrote in his book, "causers, not causes, produce democracies." Change is a result of how leaders interpret the world, establish their own perceptions, formulate policies, and hold beliefs and conventions. The acts of the leader have a significant impact on the

17

transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic regime (Huntington, 2012).

Theoretical frameworks have been developed by researchers to explain the phenomena of leadership. These theories do not prove that the phenomena is real. They often don't apply to emerging cultures since their growth and functioning don't accurately represent reality. Similar to this, the popular ideas, methods, and hypotheses do not adequately describe the truth of leadership. Pakistan's culture, social mores, and political economy present a complicated context that makes it difficult to pinpoint who should be in charge of democratising the nation. Quaid-e-Azam, the man who founded Pakistan, firmly believed in democracy and its principles. He was a notable politician and constitutionalist in the Indian Subcontinent. Quaid-e-Azam once remarked: "I'm positive democracy is in our DNA. In fact, it's buried deep within our bones. Only centuries of unfavourable conditions may explain why this blood's circulation is frigid. Our arteries are no longer working since it has frozen. But praise God, the blood is flowing normally once more. A peoples' government will be in place (Castellví, 2003).

Different practical themes must be established in order to understand leadership and its function in the democractic process. It is important to thoroughly operationalize these topics. The complex socio-political matrix becomes a barrier to the truth. Urban leadership is made up of the landed aristocracy, the corporate class, the bureaucracy, and the socially dominant. The military has also become a class of leadership in Pakistan. Military oligarchy was developed in the nation as a result of the military elite gaining control of the government. On the other hand, feudal lords always seek for positions of power, and as a result, they frequently switch allegiances to join these institutions (Zaidi, 2018).

18

Direct and indirect democracies are the two different forms of democracies. In ancient Greek or Athenian democracy, direct citizen input was likely. It gave individuals the option to decide on policies and actions. Direct democracy refers to a system in which citizens participate directly in state politics. Being tiny city states, as opposed to the modern sovereign nation systems of today, it was simple to control the involvement of that people. According to analysis, what is known as indirect democracy in the current era is a rule of representatives. Through elected individuals or representatives, the civic community is represented. Having liberal democracy by selected people in whatever manner has also grown to be one of the characteristics of modern nations. As a result, there is one more crucial element that has to be addressed: a nation can only be described as democratic if its leaders are chosen via elections that are fair, respect for civil freedoms, and the rule of law. When a nation develops and is prepared for this type of administration, it is said to have undergone democratization. At the same time, it becomes challenging to pinpoint the conditions that may enable democracy and the areas in which it occurs. It represents a shift to more democratic values that include the participation of the populace, liberty, fairness, competition, the rule of law, and the protection of rights. It may be a shift from an authoritarian to a democratic system (Magen, 2008). It is a complicated phenomenon with several patterns, making it difficult to investigate and understand all of its ramifications. Different types of political phenomena are described using these features and patterns.

Additionally, a few additional characteristics or circumstances have a significant impact on the democracy process in one of two ways because they restrict the democratisation process itself. Some academics and authors have

19

examined democratisation from the standpoint of citizenship. Charles Tilly holds the belief that democratisation is a trend toward broad citizenship, equal citizenship, and fortification of citizenship in his work "Process and Mechanism of Democratization." Effective leadership fosters the growth and development of citizens. The most important relationship is that between the leader and the population, and it is independent of the leader's performance even though it fluctuates occasionally. Maintaining the confidence of the public in the president or prime minister is also crucial. The fundamental ingredients that contribute to emotions of mistrust against the government and its subversion are dissatisfaction with the political leader and a loss of faith, belief, and confidence in polities (Batool, 2019).

Character integrity is fundamentally linked to a leader's ability to make the correct judgments and rule more effectively. What the leader says, how he stands up for it, how he acts, and what he discloses shape how authentically he integrates. It has an impact on the democratic process in either a favourable or bad way. Culture is something that is included into the human prototype in regards to every aspect of human existence, in addition to character. Additionally, it offers a model for how leaders should act and function. It is also a fact that different leadership styles may be effective or ineffective in certain circumstances where they tolerate a variety of disputes and collaboration from the general public, institutions, etc (Hwang, 2015).

Three waves of democracy were described by S.P. Huntington. In contrast to giving emphasis to participation, he emphasised that "competition is the key requirement to see democratisation in every nation and it is a historical practise and experience." (Huntington, 2012). Democraticization is the transition from a non-democratic system to one that is more democratic. The three rounds of democracy

20

that Huntington considered in his paper are as follows:

The first wave began in the nineteenth century when roughly thirty countries achieved democracy. At the end of World War I, this procedure was come to an end.

During World War II, as decolonization was underway, the second wave began. At this period, democracy was introduced in around 36 nations.

The third wave was an unusual aspect of the turn of the twentieth century. Waves refers to what and how nations changed from autocratic to democratic governance in various geographic and temporal contexts.

In his book "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century," Huntington also focuses on the reasons why democratisation occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.

Not only are the reasons being sought after, but also the mode of action. What steps were taken and what strategies were used to bring about democracy in these countries?

The first wave of the democratic process began when it was thought that monarchs, empires, and feudal aristocracies needed to be removed in order to avoid authoritarian government. To overthrow fascist regimes, colonies, and military dictatorships, a second wave was undertaken. One-party government, military dictatorship, and personal power are all elements of the third wave. Where military, monarchical, or fascist authorities were in charge without receiving widespread support for their policies, all three waves sought to provide people the right to participate in society. Huntington firmly believes that the masses or the people are the driving force behind democratic transformation. He asserted that "causers, not

21

causes, build democracies." Leadership insight, preferences, convictions, actions, values, ethics, strategy, and policies, among other things, all influence change. With the leader's consent, the final conclusion and consequence will be disclosed (Huntington, 2012).

The most important change and process in contemporary nation-state systems, democratisation, only functions if elites and leaders are involved in some capacity. The privileged heavily influence change, therefore the ruler is given the semblance of democracy. Talking to those who think differently than you do will speed up the democratic process and influence people's attitudes toward tolerance. The necessity to replace the monarchical government with a system that is focused on the masses should not just be in the words of the leaders. Only if the subsequent measures function differently but in the greatest interests of people can these processes of democracy take place.

Leadership has always been lacking in Pakistan. As soon as Pakistan was established, Quaid-e-Azam died, and the country immediately began to experience issues in every aspect of life. The way the government operated was inconsistent. Political institutions did not function, and from 1947 to 1958, seven administrations quickly took control of the nation's affairs before dissolving one after another. The country was put under martial law in 1958 by General Ayub Khan. It allegedly hindered the country's democratic progress, and in 1962 he implemented the fundamental democracy system, which eventually proved ineffectual chiefly because of the influence of the Military, Bureaucratic, and political elites.

Pakistan's constitution was changed in 1973 when Z.A. Bhutto took office.

22

Although his popularity gave rise to hope, his supporters still produced a climate that was unsuitable for the country's development of democracy and leadership. Instead, erratic politics created the conditions for military rule. General Zia-ul-Haq reinstated martial law in the nation in 1977, and the constitution was suspended by the authorities in charge. In 1985, General Zia conducted elections on a non-party basis. Political leaders ushered in a new kind of democratic process that was marked by graft, back-stabbing, self-aggrandizement, and leg-pulling. An aircraft disaster claimed the life of General Zia-ul-Haq. Elections were held and an interim administration was established. The Pakistan Democratic Front (PDF) and Islamic Jumhori Itehad (IJI) engaged in a political see-saw from 1988 to 1999. (PDF). In actuality, Nawaz Sharif, the leader of the Muslim League (MLN), and Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led these coalitions.

Political administrations and their overthrow created a praetorian atmosphere. It presented General Pervez Musharraf with a chance to seize control. He emphasised the democratic state in the nation after entering politics by saying, "We have experienced fake democracy." He announced the Devolution Plan and pledged to organise elections in October 2002 as a means of enforcing democratic changes in order to address this democratic crisis. After the elections, a new government took office. However, it remained to be seen if they were able to handle the difficulties that the nation was experiencing in bringing and enforcing democratic norms. It is the responsibility of the leaders to direct events in the proper direction. Societies are created by their leaders.

Pakistani leadership in the 2002 elections was based on education. The need for effective leadership has historically been education, yet this is only an experience

requirement and has nothing to do with competent leadership. Several authors have discussed Pakistan's political system in relation to leadership. The lack of strong leadership in Pakistan's political system has been noted by many, including Khalid bin Sayeed, Mushtaq Ahmed, Mohammad Waseem, Hasan Askari Rizvi, Mushahid Hussain, and Shahid Javed Burki. Other critics include Saeed Shafqat, Stanley Walport, Iskander Hayat, Roedad Khan, Arshad Sami Khan, Birjees Nagy, Anwar.H. Syed, 11 There is a scarcity of writing on competent and successful leadership in the civil and military, despite the fact that the importance of leadership has been extensively discussed. On the basis of a few factors that the researcher selected for this study, the function of political leaders in the process of democracy is the focus of this study. The significance associated with the debate of the efficacy and performance of political leadership in nations like Pakistan has been kept in mind (Shah, 2016).

2.2 Factors of Democratization

Ten factors, according to Michael J. Sodaro, are necessary for both the smooth continuation of democracy and its long-term success. These ten criteria eventually aid in the reconstruction of democratic standards, even if they do not constitute a fool proof formula with 100% success rates. Since each democracy is unique, it is unlikely that they are all applying the same elements, and even if they were, the results would be different (Sodaro, 2001). For instance, while education is important to democracy's success, it is not the sole factor, and not all democracies have a strong educational system. Every state finds a unique path to democracy based on its own peculiarities.

There are nations that do not adhere to democratic principles but are

24

successful, and there are nations that do adhere to democratic principles but are unsuccessful (Sodaro, 2001). Democracy can last forever, but it doesn't follow a set formula and can take many different forms. The 10 independent factors that boost the likelihood of democratic consolidation are listed below. The following factors are necessary for good democracy promotion.

1. Institutions of State: Stateness

2. Elite class commitment to democracy

3. A sound economy

4. Support for the middle class

5. Private businesses

6. Adoption and promotion of democratic principles and values

7. Democratization of politics

8. Rate of Literacy

9. Social Uniformity

10. Helpful international law

The efficacy of governmental institutions in demonstrating legitimacy over specific areas is the very first aspect that leads to democracy (Sodaro, 2001). This theory inspires Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz's notion of "Stateness" as a necessary condition for democracy (Stepan, 2011). Both the efficient operation of democracy and its strength depend on the legitimacy of the ruling class. Since state institutions are in charge of overseeing every aspect of democratic functioning, they are

25

intimately related to how democracy functions. There are several nations undergoing the process of democracy, with Yugoslavia and Russia serving as two prominent examples (Sodaro, 2001).

The notion of democracy as a whole is, in some ways, concluded by the validity of the institutions; sovereignty; liberty; equality; and fundamental rights. Without the implementation of robust state institutions, none of these concepts are even remotely feasible. Important state institutions including the legislative, executive branch, judicial branch, military branch, and bureaucracy must behave in a way to preserve their power in a way that they guard against any harm to democracy. The democratic process is under risk when the governmental institutions fail to protect fundamental freedoms, rights, and the will of the people. The bureaucracy must promote democracy and aid the civilian administration in formulating policies, the military must behave as a subordinate of the government, and the court must be free from outside influence. The efficiency of a single department is insufficient for democratisation; all major institutions must be efficient. When governmental institutions are structured in accordance with democratic principles, the process can only be successful.

```
                        ┌─────────────────────┐
                        │                     │
                        │  Democratization    │
                        │                     │
                        └──────────┬──────────┘
              ┌────────────────────┴────────────────────┐
    ┌─────────────────────┐                  ┌─────────────────────────────┐
    │ Sateness, Institutions │                │    Stable Economy           │
    │    of a State         │                 │    Private Business         │
    └──────────┬──────────┘                   │    Middle Class             │
               │                              │  Acceptance of Democracy    │
    ┌─────────────────────────────┐           │ Democratic Political Culture│
    │      Legistaure             │           │    Literacy Rate            │
    │      Executive              │           │   Social Homogeneity        │
    │      Judiciary              │           │   International Order        │
    │      Military               │           └─────────────────────────────┘
    │      Media                  │
    │ Democratic Commitment of Elite │
    └─────────────────────────────┘
```

27

Figure 1 Factors leading to Democratization

Numerous historical instances demonstrate how democracy depends on a sound institutional framework for success. While history has also demonstrated that an unstable process may undermine democracy (Unger, 1987). The breakdown of democracy was caused by several demands for power and domination from various state actors, including as the military. Because their armies are more powerful than their civilian administrations, military intervention is likely to occur in many democratically emerging nations. Despite the fact that democracy is the people's form of governance, almost all contemporary liberal democracies portray a government of a certain class that is known as the elite class. The phrase "elite" refers to a group of people that also includes administrative leaders, numerous prominent figures, and politicians.

There are just a few instances in which this class promotes the democratic system, such as the American top class in 1970, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, the elite in many communist governments who formed the driving force behind the transition from capitalism to democracy, and Latin America. According to Peter Bachrach's idea, the foundation of "democratic elitism" is the elites' steadfast adherence to democratic standards (Bachrach, 1967). Particularly in emerging nations when the general populace lacks sufficient political consciousness. Politically aware governments can surely handle this elite group, but politically less aware nations may run into some issues because of the close relationship between elite conditions and mass political conduct. In the end, democracy depends greatly on how the public behaves (Sodaro, 2001).

28

Due to this class's intense efforts to further its own personal interests, its dominance raises the likelihood of corruption. Although corruption exists in all democracies, it is most prevalent in developing nations where the top class is more powerful than in industrialised nations (Sodaro, 2001). Providing effective and efficient leadership that appeals to the people and also supports democracy in an amazing way is one of the requirements for democratisation. The characteristics of the leaders who participate in the process of democracy and consolidation determine the entire drama. When a state struggles with a lack of leadership, there is a great likelihood that the process may veer off course. For instance, Pakistan first had this issue since the nation lacked a charismatic leader to succeed Quaid-e-Azam, which opened the door for other actors to intervene. Although there are a few additional elements at play, the absence of the system's pinnacle in terms of civilian leadership offered others more opportunity to fill the void. There are several instances where the military steps in to fill this leadership void. Take the military takeovers in 1969, 1977, and 1999 as examples. Leadership is essential for the development of democracy, and it must come from a variety of traditions. For the democratic governments to produce the finest leaders, they must concentrate on their political cultures (Sadaro, 2001).

The state's economy and political stability are the next two elements that influence the development of democratisation. Stability is needed for democratisation, and the economy has a tendency to produce it. The independence of private enterprise is crucial in contemporary liberal democracies. Many academics hold the view that political freedom follows economic freedom, and this premise is somewhat supported by the evidence. Similarly, a lot of people think that a lack of

29

economic freedom results in non-democratic governments (Sodaro, 2001).

Since just one percent of society is wealthy and the majority of people live in poverty or the middle class, the middle class plays a crucial role in the establishment of democracies. It is the actual, physical force that keeps democracies in place. According to a large number of experts on democracies, cultures without a middle class are less likely to establish democratic standards. The recovery of the elite class is important to this sizable middle class. The struggle between the middle class and the elite will probably prevent anybody from undermining democratic standards. There is a belief that the middle class cultivates a supportive democratic environment by creating small businesses for their own support (Gabriel, 2011).

This idea was supported by scholars in ancient Greece because this class demanded that the government be held accountable. Every state has a different class structure; in Pakistan, for instance, there are several different classes, including upper class (elite class), middle class (upper middle class, middle class, and lower middle class), and impoverished class (Gabriel, 2011). The development of democracies in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France is historically tied to this middle class, since these middle classes utilised their power to foster a democratic environment and promote democracy as a system (Sodaro, 2001).

Their true support is focused on avoiding systemic obstacles rather than democracy. The middle class of Pakistan may support any government as long as it provides them with stability, i.e., the middle class supports non-democratic regimes because they do so. Therefore, the middle class will support whichever system

offers them the protection they need, not democracy, but rather their own personal safety. The public will abandon democracy and begin to support alternative ideologies if a democratic government is unable to provide their requirements.

2.3 Majors Concerns for Democratization in Pakistan

The first has to do with how we see the circumstances in which democracy might occur. The governments of the top developed democracies increasingly prioritise democratisation in the former autocracies, yet after a generation of comprehensive social science study, we are less convinced than ever about how to construct and maintain democratic political institutions. The second major issue is not one of analytical comprehension but rather one of actualizing the political system of democratisation in Pakistan.

Nobody in Pakistan makes the claim that the process of democracy is effortless or automatic. The third obstacle to democratisation is what is happening to democracy within Pakistan's political structure. It is logical to presume that those political systems now seeking to move away from authoritarianism face the challenge of democratisation. However, the societies that underwent the democratic transformation throughout the earlier historical waves of democratisation in this century did not remain still.

Although the establishment of democratic institutions took place over a relatively short period of time, democratisation was not a one-time occurrence; rather, it was followed by a more prolonged process intended to change elite and public attitudes in opposition to democratic practises. Significant political change was ongoing even during the legislative terms of 1947–1958, 1973–1977,

31

1988–1997, and 2008–present, and this political transformation has a highly complicated impact on the issue of democratisation. In order to do this, they frequently work to create the necessary and sufficient circumstances for a democratic regime: conditions that must exist in order for democracy to exist, or conditions that are sufficient in and of themselves to bring about democracy.

The majority of negative feedback, both inside and outside the approach, presupposes that their success or failure in this area is vital. He understands that democratisation involves many varied force configurations depending on the scenario being studied. Nevertheless, he makes an effort to verify the specific justifications offered by presenting a number of broad prerequisites for democracy. Democratization does not necessitate a bloody revolution; instead, we may anticipate it to be linked to significant adjustments in societal norms and structures. These changes could be enough to make us lose trust in any durable foundation that unified theoretical explanation must rely on. It's also possible that the democratic process itself reflects something similar.

As a reaction to contingency, a democratic system may be understood as the institutionalisation of popular choice. In such a system, the attempt to force a theoretical consistency of structural explanation on occurrences may be counterproductive. One may also argue that Pakistan is experiencing difficulties with the consolidation and transition of democracy. That is, a situation in which the country's democratic transition has never been fully solidified.

2.4 Theories of Democratization

Theories of democracy have focused mostly on causality and the determination of

the primary causes that result in democracies developing. The majority of democratisation explanations incorporate components from three different theories: modernization theory, historic sociology (also referred as structuralism), and transition theory (also known as agency theory). Because of their drastically different views on structure and agency, structuralist theories (such as modernization and historic sociology) and agency-based methods (such as transition theory) are sometimes simply distinguished from one another. This section outlines these various strategies and looks at their use in the literature on modern democracy. To some extent, theories are therefore destined to be sparse and incomplete explanations; it should be kept in mind that all theories are efforts to impose order and uncover patterns in the chaotic and complicated reality of human existence. No one theory can fully explain a specific instance on its own. However, the ideas are valuable in that they raise significant issues with democracy in general and offer specific answers.

In the 1990s, as more democracies emerged, the discussion also began to centre on consolidation, or the elements that help democracies persist. The discussion of consolidation can benefit from each of the three approaches' unique contributions. They all do, although, have some very important restrictions in this respect. As a result, the section suggests a different angle that examines democratizations in terms of three crucial dimensions: the state, civil society, and globalisation.

2.4.1 Modernization Theory

According to Giddens (1990), modernity is intrinsically globalising, spreading over the world and resulting in a single homogenous culture. In other words, democratisation and globalisation are inextricably linked by modernization theory. It

ties the growth of democracy to modernism and the notion of progress' universality that emerged during the Age of Enlightenment. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) codified it within democratisation studies and it draws on a combination of Weberian notions of the "modern" state and classical sociology's interest in describing the social transitions that took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the shift from from feudalism to capitalism, from traditional to contemporary, and from ascription to achievement. The work of Talcott Parsons (1951) is a contemporary reflection of the propensity of classical sociology to categorise cultures in terms of straightforward oppositions. As a transition from diffuseness to precision and from particularism to universalism, he defined modernity. According to modernization theory, all emerging or non-democratic nations should strive to reach the traits that he defines as modernity. The processes of change that took place in the 19th century in the Atlantic societies of Britain and the US, as well as, to a lesser degree, in Western Europe as a whole, are identified with modernity. Therefore, capitalism is basically what gave rise to contemporary civilization. Lipset believed that modernity was a single, shared experience that produced mostly comparable cultures and nations. Modernization, as a philosophy of change, is functionalist and economic in that it regards democracy as a byproduct of capitalism. It links advancement and economic growth in a causal way. Modernization is also prognostic; democracy emerges in countries that are able to "replicate the initial shift" to capitalism and integrate themselves into supranational economic systems (Roxborough, 1979).

2.4.1.1 Evaluating Modernization Theory

The idea of modernization seeks to explain how capitalism has enabled

34

democracies to flourish in the modern world. It has made an effort to identify the specific features of capitalism that support democracy. Its power lies in that. But it makes the assumption that capitalism and democracy have an unduly straightforward and linear relationship. It has been said that modernization theory is too structural, ahistorical, and ethnocentric as a result. The conventional approach used within modernization studies has also been questioned.

Because it assumes that all cultures can mimic a shift that actually happened at a certain point in time and location, modernization is ahistorical. It ignores the challenges indeed, the impossibility—of one civilization trying to replicate what happened in another society at a different period, as well as the worldwide shifts that have made capitalism a global order instead of an economic system limited to the borders of certain nation states. According to modernization's detractors, late development has really produced a perverse kind of modernity characterised by authoritarian capitalism instead of democracy (Frank 1971; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). According to O'Donnell's (1973) prominent study of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the rise of dictatorships rather than democracies coincides with the intensification of capitalism in emerging nations. He contends that a politically influential but numerically tiny bourgeoisie use the state to increase its profits through repression. These opponents believed that modernization's presumption that capitalism was the root of democracy was both intellectually unsound and factually unsound. From a somewhat different angle, Beetham (1997) has also argued that it is unsustainable to believe that the market would always be supportive of democracy. Markets have the power to strengthen or weaken democracy.

Finally, modernisation is also intrinsically ethnocentric since it ignores the

35

unique development efforts of the third world and extrapolates a "law" for the entire planet based on the experiences of the Western world. A criticism of a different order is the notion that modernization is an excessively structural account of political change. It is stated that the function of structure (capitalism) is overemphasised at the cost of human activity rather than challenging the fundamental tenets of modernity. In other words, politics is ignored by modernity, which should be critiqued "for being unduly preoccupied with structures and thereby believing that the behaviour of people - whether classes, groups, or individuals - is epiphenomenal and eventually reducible to material or other conditions." (Schmitz and Sell 1999: 24).

2.4.1.2 Modernization Theory Today

The most persuasive current explanation of modernity is provided by Leftwich (1996). It makes sense that he exclusively applies it to poorer countries. He contends that economic growth, whether it occurs in a political environment that is democratic or not, will necessarily result in democracy in the long run. In light of this, he advises that "the West should... assist only those devoted and determined developmental elites that are truly focused on supporting economic progress, whether democratic or not." Because doing so will aid them in increasing their level of economic growth and in establishing or consolidating the internal framework necessary for a viable democracy (Leftwich 1996). However, it is unusual for modernism to have endured in such an unaltered manner. Modernizations generally do not assert a direct causal relationship between democracy and capitalism. Diamond has had a significant impact on the modernization theory update. In particular, he emphasises the need of political culture and a vibrant civil society for

36

democratisation, building on the 1960s preoccupation with public involvement and political culture in freshly "modernised" regimes. He has done this by focusing modernisation on consolidation rather than on a debate of the reasons for democracy. He contends that a change in political culture is necessary for long-term democratic consolidation (Diamond 1999). He is actually pessimistic about the prospects for sustained democratisation in a large portion of the developing world because civil society is frequently underdeveloped and weak, and institutional and electoral regimes have political cultures that are "shallow, unaccountable, exclusive, and abusive of individual and collective rights" (Diamond 1996: 34).

2.4.2 Historical Sociology

An example of "macrohistory" is historical sociology, in which "the tool by which structures are revealed unseen to the unassisted sight" is history (Collins 1999). The method is frequently referred to as "structuralism" because of its emphasis on structures. The study of historical sociology's efforts to pinpoint various state development trajectories or routes to modernity for instance, through conflict or revolution has been a key focus (Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1990). There are two distinct philosophical traditions that inform the historical/sociological approach to democracy. It partially developed as a response to the 1960s behavioralism's overly societal interpretations of political change and presents an alternative state-centered perspective. Therefore, it is a component of the intellectual work involved in "putting the state back into" politics (Evans, 1985). Additionally, it used an explicit critique of modernization's short-termism and causal simplicity to explain democratisation (Rueschmeyer, 1992). Inevitably, it takes a considerably more nuanced approach to democratisation than modernization theory, with a focus on understanding rather

37

than forecasting results.

The way the state and classes interact over time defined by structuralists as "a human community that (successfully) purports the stranglehold of the legitimate use of physical violence inside a given territory" (Skocpol, 1985) determines the political system is of interest to them. As a result, they acknowledge that collective actors play a crucial role. They both believe that democracies do not emerge suddenly or just because certain people (individuals, organisations, or classes) decide they want one to. In order to explain the rise of democracy, structuralists argue that it is necessary to trace the history of the state and how it has changed through the lens of class conflict. Which they define as state change, has occasionally evolved. Though economic change is not, in and of itself considered as driving political results, structuralism does contain aspects of a political economy of democracy in that it highlights how economic changes—for example, the development of production for the market—lead to social or class struggle. Historical sociology, as opposed to modernization theory's wave approach, analyses elements that are unique to specific situations.

2.4.3 Transition Studies

The agency method, often known as the transition approach, holds that aware, dedicated individuals may construct democracy as long as they also have some luck and are ready to make concessions. Therefore, achieving democracy does not require expecting for economic conditions to improve or for the political conflicts sparked by economic change to be resolved. The conflict between structuralists and modernization theorists and agency-centered researchers centres on the functions played by actors, structures, cultures, and class connections in democratisation and

regime transition. According to the transition school, both modernizationists and structuralists believe that history, development, and the economy have a dominant influence on political outcomes. For structuralists and proponents of modernization theory, democracy is a unique development that has only happened in a few places on the planet. It cannot be replicated in nations that lack the necessary levels of development or that have a class or social structure that is hostile to it. The appeal of the transition strategy, however, lies precisely in the fact that it challenges these too gloomy preconceptions. According to agency perspectives, democracy may be established regardless of the structural framework. In large part, transitology's success in politics and academia may be attributed to its optimism, since this appeared to be the case by the end of the 1980s. Therefore, the transition strategy implicitly assumes that there is a strong likelihood of extending democracy under the current global system. It postulates that democracy will succeed provided elites can figure out the "correct" course of action.

Rustow's (1970) critique of modernisation serves as the theoretical foundation for transition techniques. According to Rustow, the problem with modernization theory is that it confuses the "genetic" reasons of nascent democracies with the "functional" characteristics of mature democracies, which are what enable them to flourish. The great majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no question or mental misgivings as to which political group they belong, he contends, and this is the sole prerequisite for democracy (Rustow 1970: 350). The development of democracy, according to Rustow's theory, is a dynamic process that goes through three stages: preparation, decision, and habituation. The decision phase is where 'a small circle of leaders' play a particularly crucial role in terms of

their decisions and negotiations (Rustow 1970: 356). The habituation phase is where citizens and leaders fully adapt to the new system. Later, these phases became liberalisation, transition, and consolidation.

The advantage of agency-centered theories of democratisation is that they place the study of democracy inside accepted epistemologies and methodology in political science. Transition studies provide a "political" justification for democracy by leaning on theories of political action and implicitly abandoning both sociological or historical methodologies. The process of democratisation is understood. Choices are "caught up in a constant redefining of actors' perceptions of desires and limitations," according to process-oriented researchers (Kitschelt 1992: 1028).

2.4.4 An Alternative Approach: The State, Globalization, and Civil Society

The importance that reasons, culture, individual and group action, economic growth, social conflict, and transnational elements are given in the theories of democratisation that we have so far found varies. They make use of many social change theories and epistemologies. When considered collectively, these studies have produced a wealth of literature and established the study of democratisation as a key discipline within the social sciences. They have illuminated various facets of regime change, transition, and the character of politics immediately following a shift. Although their primary focus has often not been on consolidation but rather on causality, in certain situations they also provide light on specifics of why some systems may go towards consolidation while others cannot.

This was an important area of study throughout the early stages of democratisation. Some modern democratic initiatives, however, date back more than

40

25 years. It seems to reason that scholarly interest is now focused more on the viability of emerging democracies and the nature of democracy than on the quantity of transitions that are occurring. The process of democratisation is fraught with danger, and trials that start with transition don't necessarily lead to consolidation. However, it is not always obvious why democracy works in some situations but not in others. Theoretical advancement has not yet kept up with the evolving research agenda. There is a need for new methodologies that explain both the initial change and what happens thereafter.

Therefore, a comprehensive explanation of democratisation is required. This research utilizes a framework that specifically relies on the knowledge gained through the historical sociology method. In other words, structures are crucial for explaining results. However, the transition perspective's primary contribution to the democratisation debate—namely, that democracy is a dynamic process influenced by human behaviour and choices—is likewise of utmost significance. Actors, both collective and individual, fight to oust autocratic governments and establish democracies. However, they work in organised settings. The influence of structures like state-society interaction patterns, organisational and mobilisation customs, state capability, and the international order, among others, heavily influences the choices that are available to them. This is not meant to imply that results are already known. In some nations, democratisation is not inescapable; similarly, not all democracies' attempts end in failure. However, some nations have more potential for democracy than others. The possibilities for democracy are increased by economic growth, the formation of a powerful working class or other subaltern groups, and the development of a complex state. In other words, democratisation

41

involves more class or social movement collective activity than it does specific individual autonomy.

CHAPTER 3

LEGISLATURE (PARLIAMENT) AND EXECUTIVE (CIVIL SUPREMACY)

3.0 History of Democratization in Pakistan

With the changeover from one elected administration to another, Pakistan historically encountered a situation where it was impossible to find a solid democracy. Democracy has come to be associated with a certain person. For very good cause, the elimination of this individuality is viewed as the assassination of democracy. It's spreading the cult of personality. A specific party refers to a certain person. It is the person's name that is viewed as attractive, not the party platform, which is published solely as a formality and thrown in the trash after the elections since it is done somewhere (Tudor, 2013).

In large part due to the way certain social elites pursued their preferences and the way those in power disregarded their mandate as democratic, Pakistan's democracy has failed over the course of nearly seven decades, as evidenced by protracted periods of authoritarian government and flawed civilian democracies. However, democratic goals in the nation continue to exist despite the beating they have received, as seen by the dominant majority opinions. Pakistan continues to be a relatively friendly environment for Western ideas of democratic principles and institutions. From an intellectual constitutional perspective, democracy is not the

42

nation's primary aim. The society still aspires to fundamental ideals like representative governance and the rule of law (Giunchi, 2014).

Weinbaum (2007), noted that Pakistan's administrative structure is a holdover from colonial control; any changes made served to forward the agenda of parties having sway over the government, and as a result, the administration came to rule for itself.

Pakistan's democratisation process may have appeared healthier after independence and still improved over what it had been, Pakistan's political history indicates that true or appropriate democracy is still a long way from being recognised and stand alone for very well. Joint political issues, the participation and opportunism of political figures as well as of civil society, and parallel issues that were made to appear more incongruous to more directly conflicted were all discussed. Many academics believe that Mr. Jinnah was a representative of modern, liberal customs as opposed to conservative Islamic ones, but because he passed away so soon after Pakistan's independence, he was unable to fulfil what many believed to be a democratic and modern dream for Pakistan, which is particularly striking when compared to India's early years of independence.

Another opinion that is maintained in this respect is that the leaders who were most actively involved in creating Pakistan were those who had wandered from Muslim-minority areas of all of India and encouraged them to settle in the newly formed west Pakistan. This economic and political elite did not originate in the freshly formed nation, thus they were not eager to begin a democratic process since they would have fallen short in any election contest. The bureaucracy was the most

43

well-planned organisation in the newly formed Pakistan, and many of its members had migrated from the regions that were once a part of both Pakistan's and India's militaries. All of these incomplete explanations demonstrate why democracy did not establish itself in Pakistan in the early years and initially because it did so only after the practise of civilian and primarily military authoritarianism had established its hold. As a result, it was unlikely that democracy could have subsequently released that hold. Pakistan's politically structured units have been greatly democratised, as seen by lower socioeconomic strata having broader access to society and its organisations. There is a scenario involving the state personality of Pakistan, its socioeconomic classes, and the positions of institutions and actors who hold power in the state. As a result, they collide with Pakistan's political environment and democratic system (Khan, 2022).

Political rivalry among various members of the landowning class prevented those politicians from emerging as a strong, unified political force with clarity on the status of political parties. As manufacturing expanded with the help of the bureaucracy and aspirant entrepreneurs, the military came into view as a continual defence. Ayub Khan's transfers of power from Karachi towards Lahore and Rawalpindi influenced in additional picture for original and rural Pakistan, which is one reason why agriculture acquired renown throughout the decade. Landowners were once again rising mostly on political perspective in the late 1950s. A political culture is a set of beliefs, values, and facts that may be generally accepted throughout a community and has the appearance of a system. Learning and passing down knowledge from one generation to the next is increasingly commonplace. Without a doubt, the advancement of culture in many cultures suggests that

44

conditions should work together. These responses are crucial for how people interpret their personal conditions, orientations, and processes. They are important not just for external circumstances but also for ongoing differences in practises and cultural knowledge models. Politics and resistance to power are regulated at different societal levels (Tudor, 2013, p.2).

3.1 Challenges to parliamentary democracy

The most recent transition to electoral democracy in Pakistan, which began in 2008, is an odd scenario. It seems to prove that modernisation breeds instability, in line with Huntington's central premise in his seminal book "Political Order in Changing Societies" (1968). More precisely, Pakistan's democratisation is apparently creating contemporary kinds of organisations in which various groups and political parties are adopting the concepts of freedoms of expression to protest. While it's possible that the political system's openness has given previously reticent groups greater confidence to express themselves, it's interesting to note that the way these concepts are being adopted by various groups has resulted in scenarios that might destabilise the system. The novelty is in the formation of a political party that rose to fame in the second general elections of the current electoral consensus and has since participated in parliamentary action. Divided countries frequently see violent protests, and Pakistan is no exclusion.

In light of this paradox, the determination of this research is to provide an answer to the question of why Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a political party with within-system objectives and a sizable stake in the political scheme, participates in

parliamentary activity that threatens to topple the political system itself. In several points throughout the case study, similarities to Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the dominant opposition party in parliament, were drawn.

This study were address the theoretical gap in major party literature that exists in elucidating parliamentary activity by such a political party with within-scheme targets and borrow facilities from social drive literary works by demonstrating their superiority in elucidating some aspects of this phenomenon. The expenses related to legislative activities for a within-system party was demonstrated by demonstrating how they result from a party adopting a public persona. The study's unique contribution, Party on the Street, expands on Katz (1993) three faces of the party by including a fourth face. The PTI were used as an example to show how the "face of the party on the street" conveys the traits of the party when it participates in parliamentary action. This was then be compared to the PTI's public image of the party to demonstrate how the militancy of the public face of the party is fleeting but overshadows the much more sober public face of the party, with the latter having clear benefits in terms of prominent a much additional advanced image of the party. It was then be demonstrated that the PTI made a sensible decision to maintain its public persona given the structural benefits associated with portraying the opposition party as a crisis that threatens the stability of the whole system. In order to lay out these structural incentives, it is necessary to first discuss Pakistan's entire system of patronage politics. This were demonstrate how political parties rely on local politicians for electoral success and how the latter's independence from the former encourages defections to political parties with a good chance of winning an election.

46

In order to demonstrate how the incentive system for politics of expediency was developed for both national and local political leaders, the role played by the military in slowing the expansion of political parties was also be explored. Since the immediately result from connecting this state of events to the comparative analysis of the PTI and the PPP, Near the end of the analysis, the political framework for the case of local dynamics and the military's involvement in the case are introduced. The PPP did engage in politics of expediency throughout its time in opposition inside the early 1990s while using parliamentary activity to exert pressure on the overthrow of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) government to the involvement of the military. However, it were be shown in detail that while the PPP's principled stance to refrain from such tactics throughout its time in opposing party after the 2013 general elections suggests political learning. From 2008 and 2013 while the PML-N was in opposition, it did not go to the same extremes as it did when it was in power, despite having twice sought the military's assistance in toppling the PPP government during that time of elective democracy (1988−1999).

A consensus here between two parties to respect appropriate limits of opposition can be seen as the logical outcome of their experience as the central government from 1988 to 1999. During that time, they saw firsthand how the military's increased involvement in politics directly contributed to their transience in office. The PTI, which has only served in provincial government, is not distinguished from these two parties by their ability to run the federal government. The different behaviour of the PPP in opposition from 2013 to 2017 would be made appropriate on the basis of political parties acting in a contextual environment driven by self-interest, but with a modified, long-term perspective of it based on political learning, by

47

demonstrating the rationality of the PTI's behaviour and with the PPP exhibiting the same behaviour in the 1990s. This would serve as the foundation for the major hypothesis that this case study would provide, which is that in situations where opposition parties have institutional incentives to participate in legislative activity, prior central government experience intervenes and modifies party behaviour. The second related premise of this study is that since it encourages the creation of crisis -like conditions, political allegiance instability and party leadership dependence on local political bosses enhance the possibility of parliamentary action by opposition parties inside the system.

This section were introduce the PTI case and provide justification for the approach chosen as well as the case selection. After looking at the gaps in political party literature and social movement literature with regard to parliamentary activities, there was a literature review that provides the theoretical background of both political parties and social movement literature. The literature on legislative action by within-system political parties were next be used to illustrate how it does not offer a theoretical foundation for analysing the PTI instance.

3.2 PTI Parliamentary Protests

The PTI is a political party that opts to protest in parliament in addition to running for office through elections. After the general elections in 2013, when it rose to become the third-largest party in Pakistan's lower house of the legislature, the National Assembly, and formed a coalition regime in Khyber Pukhtukhwa (KPK) by becoming the only party in the province's legislature, the PTI established a reputation as a party that pioneered parliamentary protests (Usman 2013). At first glance, this

48

looks strange because the party's participation in legislative proceedings while officially belonging to the political system seems inconsistent.

Strangely, the PTI's actions have demonstrated a contempt for democratic values while simultaneously accepting them as a viable foundation for a political government. For instance, it ran on the platform of change via parliamentary democracy in the 2013 general elections. It increased its representation in the National Assembly by 28 out of the 342 seats, rising to the position of second-largest opposition group. As previously indicated, it won enough seats in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's (KP) provincial assembly to take power there. As a result, the PTI has not only recognised and engaged in the election process by its words and deeds, but it also has a significant interest in it. However, it has also taken part in agitational and sit-in politics at the same time. For instance, it instructed its supporters to practise civil disobedience during a sit-in outside the parliament in 2014, where the main demand was the resignation of the then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif. This included not paying taxes, utility bills, or any other required fees (Hassan and Houreld 2014). It also encouraged overseas fund transfers to be made through hundi (Geo News 2014), an illegal method that avoids the need for any paperwork or official fees. The government's resistance to the PTI's demand that four seats be audited in order to look into possible widespread electoral cheating was a contributing factor in the events leading up to this sit-in (Malik 2013; Dawn 2014). Ultimately, the PTI decided to end its sit-in and accept a judicial commission to examine electoral rigging, reversing its earlier demand for the resignation of the then -Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, following a national tragedy wherein students were killed in a terrorist attack on Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar (Dawn 2014).

49

In a similar manner, the PTI demanded the resignation of the then-Prime Minister Sharif in 2016 and prepared to lock down Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. The identities of Sharif's three children were revealed in the revelations of the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca as a result of an investigation by the International Consortium of Independent Journalists, which revealed that the first family had offshore accounts (Haider, 2017). The first family's offshore money is being investigated, but the government and opposition cannot agree on how it will be done, so the PTI decided to up the stakes. Using its chief minister in KPK to rally supporters and workers, the PTI planned to shut down the capital till the Supreme Court of Pakistan agreed to intervene and promised that an investigation into Sharif would be conducted. This convinced the PTI to abandon its plan (Khan 2016; Ullah and Zia 2016).

3.3   Case Selection

Pakistan thus represents the extreme instance in terms of a political party's parliamentary engagement without any case-specific factors that might definitively explain that feature. The extreme instance demonstrates the phenomena under discussion in the most pronounced way, allowing for the exploration of potential explanations "in an open-ended form" (Gerring 2008, 654).

The military's active engagement in shaping Pakistan's political landscape, together with the leadership of political parties, creates an electoral energetic in which electoral victory may be attained by instigating a crisis-like scenario. Given that the military has assumed the role of arbiter of national affairs and that its

50

intelligence wing, the ISI, is active in forging as well as breaking alliances, political parties have the option of collaborating with the military to re-engineer the political calculus in their favour and/or cultivating that perception to encourage defections into their camp (Shah, 2014; Siddiqa, 2007).

3.4 The PML-N and the PPP Agency in the Presence of Structural Incentives

As previously stated, the PPP chose not to support the PTI or even organise its own disruptive demonstrations during the current election democracy. It did, however, engage in obstructive political activities from 1988 to 1999, while Pakistan was an elected democracy. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the PPP at the time, marched into the capital in 1992 as the head of the main opposition party, claiming that the 1990 elections that put the PML-N in office had been rigged. Her activities increased the pressure that led to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's 1993 overthrow of the Sharif regime. The Sharif regime was reinstalled by the Supreme Court the following year, and Bhutto led another protest into the city. This time, as was already reported, the Chief of Army Staff requested that Sharif and the President quit (Iqbal, 2014).

Therefore, the PPP serves as an example of political learning. The PPP learnt not to partake in this kind of politics in the future after seeing that the benefits it obtained from employing these legislative methods and supporting the military were always fleeting and ultimately proven to be a factor in the transience of its tenure as the ruling party. But not just the PPP is aware of this specific political dynamic in Pakistan. The PML-N also showed that it had come to the realisation that

51

collaborating with the military ultimately ended in everyone losing. In 2006, when military dictator General Musharraf was still in charge, both Sharif and Bhutto signed the Charter of Democracy (COD), which included pledges that political parties would not interfere with one another through extra-constitutional means and that no political party would ask the military for assistance in overthrowing a democratically elected government (Dawn 2006).

Although the PPP demonstrated a much higher level of adherence to this principle by supporting the ruling party when it was in opposition after 2013 than the PML-N did when it was in opposition from 2008 to 2013, neither party directly requested the support of the military nor produced a crisis significant enough to have the potential to have system-destabilizing effects for the ruling party. In 2009, the PML-N organised a march to the capital, although its sole goal was to demand that the PPP-led administration reinstate judges who had been fired by the previous military rule. The PML-N, in conjunction with other party leaders who were also a part of the long march, called it off after the government conceded to this demand while the march was still in progress and had not yet reached the capital (Al Jazeera, 2009).

When the ruling government was at the centre of a controversy over allegedly desiring US assistance in constructing civilian supremacy over the military in exchange for an offer to act in accordance with US interests in certain crucial areas of foreign policy, the PML-N also filed a petition against Asif Ali Zardari, co-chairman of the PPP and the then-President of Pakistan, in the Supreme Court. Sharif also agreed with the Supreme Court when it requested that Yousaf Raza Gilani, the PPP's elected prime minister, write to the Swiss government to request the opening of

money laundering cases against Zardari. He also agreed with the court's decision to remove Geelani from the position of prime minister (Jalal 2014).

These events demonstrated the PML-willingness Ns to bend the rules of democracy just enough to make life difficult for the incumbent government, but they did not go so far as to openly or covertly solicit military assistance or engage in parliamentary activity to the point of endangering the system.

Experience leading the federal government stands out both within the PPP and PML-N and is absent in the PTI. Political learning that prevents a political party from acting in a way that might destabilise the system and refrains from taking the dangerous bet of inviting military intervention seems to occur when political parties have repeatedly found themselves on the receiving end of military intervention. This raises the concern of whether the PTI will abandon legislative activities after having the chance to lead the federal government.

3.5 Executive (civil supremacy)

As a former British colony, Pakistan adopted the Westminster model of government in its 1973 constitution. The model is primarily founded on the ideas of popular sovereignty inculcated in the parliament, accountable government, disciplined political parties, free and fair elections, and the rule of law (Dicey, 2005). These qualifications are absent in Pakistan, unlike England. In this regard, several elements that contribute to Pakistan's parliamentary government's failure have been emphasised by various schools of thought. A group of academics contends that Pakistan's native political culture cannot coexist with western parliamentary democracy. They contend that necessary conditions are lacking, including organised

53

political parties, a constructive opposition, and fair and transparent elections (Tudor, 2013).

Pakistan does not now offer a favourable atmosphere for the Westminster system to develop. Even though India had similar issues, she has given the parliamentary democracy a better environment. Another set of academics says that the main cause of Pakistan's democratic failure is a strong central government that sacrifices the autonomy of its federating units. The federating units had grievances against the centre until the 18th Amendment was passed in 2010 (Noman, 2009; Jaffrelot, 2016).

However, despite the start of amendment in 2010, Pakistan's parliament is still helpless in the face of a strong civil bureaucracy. Other academics have shown that Pakistan's inadequate socioeconomic structure undermines the Westminster model of democracy in this way (Mohmand, 2019; Brass, 2019). Of doubt, Pakistan has a weak socioeconomic foundation, but Bangladesh and India also have reasonably stable democracies despite having worse economic foundations. Yet some academics contend that the geostrategic positioning and objectives of the major countries, including the US, China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, enhance authoritarianism at the price of democracy (Ali, 2018).

The idea that Pakistan's geographic position is a curse could be convincing, but it is also true that countries like India, Japan, Taiwan, and Malaysia all have strategic importance yet have more stable democracies than Pakistan. According to a group of academics, representational institutions lack the strength to carry out their duties in an efficient manner. This failure gives non-democratic elements like

the Pakistani military room to operate (Rodrik, 2016).

Political parties and other representative institutions struggle to carry out their duties, while unelected entities like the military and civil bureaucracy are overly powerful and prevent elected institutions from doing their jobs well. Unquestionably, Pakistan's democracy is greatly influenced by colonial legacies, a centralised federation, a fragile socioeconomic system, frequent military interventions, and geographical importance. These considerations, however, only provide a partial justification for Pakistan's parliamentary system of government's failure.

3.5.1 Civil Bureaucracy and Democracy in Pakistan

Scholars are arguing about how Pakistan's civil administration should be positioned. Some academics think that the influence and authority of civilian bureaucracy has diminished. S Akbar Ahmed said that the power and importance of bureaucracy had decreased. He also stated that following Bhutto's administrative changes in 1974 and Musharraf's devolution of power plan in 2002, the "steel frame" had completely disappeared. The changes have lessened the civil bureaucracy's previously prominent influence. Additionally, politicisation has compromised its quality. In contrast, the judiciary has adopted a more active role through activism and so-called slogan interventions. Anti-corruption organisations like the Federal Investigation Authority (FIA) and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) have implemented rigorous measures. The performance of bureaucrats has been called into question by social media and a mainstream media campaign. All of them have resulted in major governance problems that have forced public officials to leave their departments and work in development or overseas on scholarships before relocating there (Saeed, 2020). The bureaucratic elites are still strong enough to affect the

administration and the authority of the parliament, despite all these advances. The bureaucratic elite in Pakistan is strengthened by a number of elements, including the colonial heritage, a sense of superiority, technical expertise, an overly centralised organisation and concentration of power, and personal grudges between political figures.

Civilian administration in Pakistan is a strong institution due to colonial history. To counter any challenges to their authority in British India, the colonists established a hierarchical, centralised bureaucracy with rigorous laws and authorities. Following independence, Pakistan maintained the same colonial characteristics of excessive centralization and hierarchy. Due to this, Pakistan's civil and military bureaucracies are now overdeveloped as compared to the country's representative institutions (Alavi, 1972).

Another factor that gives public servants authority in Pakistan is their perception of superiority. The superior, cream, and legacy bearers of the colonial masters are civil servants who have passed a difficult test, according to Muhammad Alam, commissioner of the Inland. Given their feeling of superiority, public officials' contempt for politicians who are commoners with no formal education is only reasonable. Additionally, when they enter the power corridor, they have no idea what the constitutional framework is, what the laws and regulations are, or what the business regulations are. Civil workers feel superior to elected representatives who hold office for just a brief period of time—five years—due to politicians' "ignorance" of the intricacies of administration. (Alam, 2020).

According to him, this is how Pakistan's government system works since the

56

sectary has the majority of the country's authority and the minister is only an upper-level observer who occasionally issues commands in writing. The secretary makes the majority of the decisions. If a minister agrees with his secretary, he may act; otherwise, the matter will stay unresolved for weeks. He said, "Once I went to a secretary's office with a minister for a proper favour. In contrast to modern democracies where the secretary would be brought into the minister's office and asked to perform any task, whether legal or illegal, the minister asked the secretary to complete it. Even though it would be against the law to ask such questions in a western-developed democracy, it is strange to see this in a developing nation like Pakistan where the senior minister sits in front of the secretary rather than the other way around (Iqbal, 2020).

Additionally, government servants are widespread in Pakistan and may be found in a variety of ministries.

Jan Muhammad, a businessman who had encountered bureaucratic obstacles, made the following comment:

"If we go to the judiciary, we will find a DMG officer as the registrar, when there is an issue with land allotment, we will find bureaucrats in the municipal corporation, if there is an issue with tax or the rights of the labours or the owner of the factories, again, there will be labour inspectors in the labour department, same goes for the agriculture and for other industries". They must return to the state to settle their issue, and here is where civil bureaucracy makes agreements that breed clientalism. In Pakistan, bureaucrats have a significant influence. In addition to enriching themselves, they support systemic injustice and exploitation (Muhammad,

57

2020).

The technical expertise of the bureaucratic elite is another factor in their power. According to top bureaucrat Muhammad Alam, "bureaucrats have greater information, competence, and abilities, thus they are aware of interconnections and connections, as well as the cunning ways to wield authority and accomplish goals. Most elected politicians are unaware of these techniques. These elements let Pakistan's civil bureaucracy overgrow, enabling it to thwart any reforms or changes meant to ensure parliamentary government. The role, power, and responsiveness of Pakistan's government officials are best shown by the parliamentary politics of the years 1988 to 2019.

3.5.2 Civil resistance to the reforms of elected government

Several governments have tried to restructure the civil service to make it more responsible and effective between 1988 and 2019, but none of these attempts have been successful. Nawaz Sharif's first term administration had attempted to divide the civil service's civil and judicial responsibilities in 1990, but that effort had been failed because of bureaucrats' obstacles. He continued that Yasin Watto, Speaker of the National Assembly, had attempted to separate the civil and judicial branches of government in a similar manner in 1993. However, in the face of strong bureaucrats, it was once again unable to be put into action. The efforts by the political leadership to mainstream and merge the formerly Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and marginalised and disadvantaged regions were ongoing, but bureaucrats' resistance caused the process to be postponed until 2018 because such actions would jeopardise their interests, which were deeply ingrained in maintaining the status of FATA (Iqbal, 2020).

58

Despite the formation of various commissions and the submission of reports to enhance accountability and transparency, all of them had been defeated by bureaucratic opposition. The respondent further stated that in order to change the entire system, including tax administration and tax policy, the government attempted to get assistance from the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Massive sums of money as well as a great deal of technical assistance in the shape of trainings, automation, and business process engineering arrived. Sadly, despite more than 20 years having passed, FBR continues to struggle with data integration, subpar automation, and a lack of responsibility and response.

Furthermore, tax collector Muhammad Alam told me that in the federal secretariat, the government started the e-office initiative project in 2006 to move files electronically rather than physically carrying them from one office to another. The project had to be implemented within two years, however it took sixteen years to accomplish it. He said, "The more manual or traditionally run the system is, the happier the government workers are" (Alam, 2020).

The government has also adopted a number of measures to guarantee accountability, but these efforts have not been effective owing to a lack of cooperation. Although various agencies, such as the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) at the national level and the Ehitsab Commission (Accountability Commission) at the provincial and district levels, were established by the political leadership, their implementation was poor and below par due to bureaucrats' obstacles. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) administration tried to amend the 1973 rules of business, which advocated that the minister in charge should take the role of the secretary as head of department. It caused a massive conflict

59

between the ruling government and Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS), who were supported by Provincial Management Servants (PMS) officers (Iqbal, 2020). The aforementioned sentences and remarks make clear that civil bureaucracy obstructs any reform that would jeopardise its current position of authority. Additionally, government servants follow the outdated, traditional bureaucratic paradigm, which by nature safeguards their status, influence, and reputation.

Pakistan's civil officials cling to the traditional Weberian model of bureaucracy and oppose any changes to it. The concept is predicated on hierarchy, job specialisation or division, and stringent rules and laws. The majority of academics feel that Pakistan's public employees' resistance prevented changes like those enacted in India and Bangladesh from being implemented in the country's civil service system. Bangladesh and India both had the same bureaucratic system, but they were able to reform and change it. The traditional Weberian model and parliamentary politics are not inherently at odds, but the bureaucracy's ruling class is opposed to modernising it (Choudhery, 1990).

"One of the key issues in Pakistan is that the bureaucrats do not allow the classical Weberian model to make it more market oriented, unlike several developed democracies where the classical Weberian model has given way to market public management model," stated Ayesha Jalal on Zoom meeting to the civil servants on June 30, 2020. The public management paradigm is responsive, transparent, inclusive, and open. In the 1970s and 1980s, Margret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the US introduced a new form of governance that finally resulted in reduced government and improved governance. These states' governments improved in terms of accountability, effectiveness, openness, professionalism, and

60

inclusivity. However, Pakistan has stuck with the old classical model from its beginning, which is unsuited to the needs of the country since service delivery and governance were needed rather than rigorous rules, regulations, and control (Jalal, 1990).

The bureaucratic elites' intransigence prevents the overly centralised bureaucratic paradigm from being modified over time. There is no place for new public management because of the bureaucratic elite's resistance, Muhammad Alam had to remark. We still adhere to the two-nation doctrine, in which one nation rules and the other is subjugated, which is kind of an untouchable concept according to Lord Sahib. Since democracy is inclusive, pro-people, responsible and responsive, it is accountable, and these traits in some ways are not in harmony with parliamentary democracy, this thing is not really favourable to parliamentary democratic culture. (Alam, 2020)

Moreover, the attitude of Pakistani officials will determine the success of any future efforts to reform the civil service. According to Taqweem Saeed, "Dr. Ishrat Hussain is currently leading civil services reforms that are more oriented toward the public management paradigm. The proposed reforms include requirements for accountability, career planning, placement, hire and firing policies, and a system of rewards and penalties. All of these factors are now in line, bringing bureaucracy closer to the demands and trends of global governance, more notably the market desire for the public management model. Again, the response of Pakistan's government officials will determine whether the suggested reforms are implemented and succeed. (Saeed, 2020). Therefore, the autonomy and sovereignty of elected and represented organisations in Pakistan are impacted by the bureaucratic elite's

61

commitment to the traditional bureaucratic paradigm. Furthermore, bureaucrats establish relationships with politicians and other powerful political people in order to preserve their standing and thwart change.

Politicians and the bureaucratic elite in Pakistan are in a binary relationship. For personal reasons, bureaucrats frequently form relationships with politicians and political parties. However, politicians also use bureaucrats for their own political ends, particularly during election seasons. Muhammad Hussain, one of the respondents, stated that under the Nawaz government, a portion of District Management Group (DMG), which was informally known as DMG (N), where N stands for Nawaz Sharif, was close to the Chief Minister of Punjab. The political leaders who received favourable positions were made known to the section. However, with the inauguration of the new leadership, the old men who had a good time were left behind and were charged with accountability (Hussain, 2020).

Patronage is another characteristic of Pakistani politics. Large clients provide services to the general public on reciprocal terms and conditions. Locally powerful political figures frequently utilise the civil bureaucracy as a tool of patronage to maintain control over the populace (Shafqat, 1999).

However, according to professor Ghulam Sadiq, who specialises in the top of the bureaucracy, "Bureaucracy mediates state-market disputes, intra-market disputes, and conflicts among various parties. Taxpayers, corporate bodies, workers and corporate bodies, investors, business owners, and landlords may all have disagreements. The job of bureaucracy is to interfere, to facilitate, to offer services, such as infrastructure development, security services, legal services, and health

services. Patron-client relationships are also made possible by this arbitration and mediation. The bureaucrat expects payments from powerful politicians and businesspeople as well as other favours like promotions and transfers (Sadiq, 2020).

Within Pakistan, the bureaucracy operates like a web. Jan Muhammad, a merchant by trade, believed that "the role of bureaucrats is too important and if we go to judiciary or supreme court where the registrar is the DMG officer, we will find bureaucrats in the municipal corporation when there is an issue with land allotment, if there is an issue with tax or the rights of the labours or the owner of factories, again there will be labour inspectors, the labour department, same goes for the agriculture and for all the secto (Muhammad, 2020).

A district administration, bureaucrat–politician nexus is emerging as a distinctive element of Pakistani politics as a result of politics of patronage and the use of state resources for political objectives. If allowed to continue growing at its current rate, this nexus would lead to the formation of "Crime cartels" similar to those seen in Latin American countries where there used to be crime, smuggling, and ransom, and where offenders could easily evade the law because their patron was likely to be present at the concern office (Shafqat, 1999). Because of their association with politicians and powerful political figures, the bureaucratic elite is able to serve as a tool for powerful clients, and as a result, they pursue their own interests.

In the existence of strong civil bureaucratic elites, democracy will not be able to grow and take root since these elites constantly attempt to obstruct efficient parliamentary rule. The reasoning is straightforward: they lose prestige and power in

63

a stable system. "Bureaucratic elites pose a persistent challenge to the parliamentary democracy in Pakistan," Sajid Iqbal said in reference to this situation. It is true that a robust legislative system puts the authority and reputation of the civil service in danger. In other words, a solid democracy guarantees a productive civil administration. A minister must answer to the parliament for the ministry in question, and if something goes wrong, he must resign from his position. This is the foundation of the parliamentary form of government. A minister must maintain tight control over the whole ministry, where the majority of the staff are civil servants, in order to get out of this scenario. Therefore, a genuine parliamentary system of government provides polity accountability. As a result, the bureaucratic elite in Pakistan, who are required by law to report to ministers, oppose the growth of parliamentary democracy (Iqbal, 2020).

Second, a professor noted that the "bureaucratic elite frequently attempts to sabotage any reforms that either threaten their power and status or strengthen parliamentary governance as in the latter case they must work under cabinet and parliamentary oversight which is again dangerous for them. Again, if this bureaucratic elite had permitted changes in a timely manner, Pakistan would already have a stable parliamentary system. Third, a bureaucrat who participated in the survey said, "Bureaucrats are often content with a weaker or fragile government, as has always been the case in Pakistan." They are also sufficiently strong, but they play a hidden role, in contrast to military and religious elites, who either overthrow elected governments directly or force and influence them through protests and strikes, respectively. When civilian bureaucrats undermine an elected government from inside, this does not occur. And for this reason, from 1988 to 2019, elected

administrations were weak. Although the role of the bureaucratic elite has diminished over the past two decades, the elected government is still in danger.

Despite the fact that elections have been held on a regular basis since 2008, the parliament has remained a weaker institution and is unable to keep an eye on them. We are content and at ease with a weak administration like PTI, the same responder said in an anecdote. The explanation is straightforward: Most ministers depend on us and are powerless without us because they are inept.

3.6 Judiciary of Pakistan

One of the most significant changes in Pakistan's contemporary political system has been the establishment of the superior judiciary, which consists of the provincial high courts, the federal court of Islamic law, and the Supreme Court, as an assertive and active centre of power. As elected institutions and political parties seek for more power, inter-institutional conflict has become the norm. Pakistan's military has traditionally wielded an outsized level of power within the country. In Pakistan's highly competitive political system, the supreme court has played a pivotal role as a mediator between political and governmental elites (Kureshi, 2022).

However, the superior judiciary has evolved over the past fifteen years from merely mediating political disputes to taking on a tutelary role of its own within the political system, limiting the power of elected institutions and exercising its veto over their decisions in order to shape politics and policies to suit its own preferences. With this fresh endeavour, the court has consistently undermined both elected and unelected authorities. Opposition organisations and state officials have turned to the courts' growing assertiveness in an effort to topple civilian and military

65

administrations (Sutil, 2019).

The events of this year preceding the downfall of former prime minister Imran Khan's administration shed light on the importance of the superior judiciary, its tutelary ambitions, and its difficulty dealing with society and state institutions (Salman, 2021). After unsuccessfully trying to halt the vote and call for early elections, Khan was ordered by the Supreme Court to accept the no-confidence motion from a coalition of opposition parties in parliament. Some people think the court preserved constitutional order by making this decision, while others call it a "judicial coup."

To fully grasp the significance of this ruling from a political standpoint, it is crucial to analyse the historical and contemporary transformation of the superior court into a more independent and assertive actor. Because of recent shifts in the judiciary's structure and philosophy, it now shares the status of the military as a major, non-elected powerholder. Judicial institutions, in their efforts to leave their mark on politics and policymaking, alternately confront, restrain, and collaborate with elected and nonelected centres of power, despite efforts by political and military elites to co-opt or control judges to align the judiciary's burgeoning authority and ambition with their own interests and ambitions. This dynamic affects Pakistan's political scene. However, since its interventions raise expectations and spark political instability, the increasing judicial claim creates a precarious balance of power and vulnerability.

Why has the judiciary in Pakistan suddenly become an assertive and active centre of power in the country's politics, when it has always worked in tandem with

and been respectful of the strong civil-military bureaucracy?

The Supreme Court was first granted the power to regulate the actions of other arms of government through a variety of constitutional provisions and judicial innovation (Kureshi, 2021). The power of the courts to evaluate cases was bolstered by a constitutional amendment in 1973. The Constitution provides the high courts the ability to make sure that governmental institutions protect essential rights. With this new power, the Supreme Court has the potential to rule on issues of "public interest," such as the protection of fundamental rights. Starting in the late 1980s, public interest litigation has progressed significantly since 2006, becoming a tool the court has used to interfere with the executive and legislative branches of government in the name of the public interest. When no petitioner could be found, the chief judge began hearing cases based on newspaper and television coverage. The chief justice might make the call to act suo moto, giving the court more visibility and sway in response to public opinion.

Secondly, the judiciary severed relations with the executive branch and assumed control of judicial appointments. The power of executive institutions was formally reduced twice: first in the 1990s due to judicial intervention and again in 2010 due to a constitutional amendment. Although it is composed of a wide range of interested parties, the Judicial Commission, which is responsible for judicial nominations and promotions, is dominated by the chief justices of the Supreme Court and high courts (Strauss, 2019).

Third, the bulk of high court judges come from the legal profession, where the culture increasingly opposes procedural caution and promotes confrontation with

administrative authorities, whether elected or military (Pace, 2022). (Pace, 2022). In the 1990s, when the democratic decade began, political parties were weakly institutionalised and inter-institutional conflict was the norm. As a result, judges and lawyers began to believe that the political leadership of the state lacked legitimacy, and that the judiciary could exert significant influence over national politics and policies. Together, expanded judicial power, separation of powers, judicialization of politics, and a shift in legal norms allowed the court to take a more ambitious, combative course.

Because the court has such a significant impact and role in shaping political outcomes, the role and authority of chief justices have taken on new relevance. In the past, public interest litigation and judicial nominations were left up to the individual judges, but now, the chief justices of the high courts and the Supreme Court have come to decide when cases would be accepted for hearings, how many, and which judges would hear such cases (Michalak, 2021). Thus, chief justices can set the agenda for the court and, through bench selection, affect the results of individual cases. Because of the concentration of power in the judiciary, a chief judge who has been co-opted by the military or a political party may now significantly impact the decisions of a single court.

However, the military and political elites' attempts to co-opt and dominate the court are hindered by the judiciary's deep links to bar associations. As they develop their skills as lawyers, judges primarily contact with members of the bar in order to build their reputations. The legal community has established a strong political involvement and has successfully banded together around pressing political and professional issues. The Lawyers' Movement in 2007 brought the bar's ability for

collective action and disruption to the forefront, and it can operate as a counterweight to attempts by political and military authorities to tame the court. Now that political parties and the military are aware of this, they are making more efforts to persuade and convince bar leaders in order to indirectly influence judges. The tendency toward growing conflict in the judiciary may be traced, in part, to the close, if occasionally contentious, interactions between the bar and the court, as well as the shared legal culture (González, 2021).

There was an agreement reached in 2017 between the military leadership, several senior judges of the Supreme Court, and the political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) that all players in the political system needed to be brought onto the same page, with institutional stakeholders aligned around a common platform. They all agreed that the corrupt leaders of the major political parties in Pakistan were to blame for the country's troubles (the PML-N and the PPP). As a result, we needed to do everything it took to free public institutions from their sway (Usman, 2022).

In its anti-corruption jurisprudence from 2017 to 2018, the Supreme Court frequently heard petitions submitted against the PPP and PML-N by PTI members. As a result of their collusion, party officials like Sharif were barred from holding public office. Khan's populist PTI party gained ground as a result of these exclusions. PTI rode the wave of judicial activism, using rulings to buttress its accusations that traditional political parties were tainted with corruption. The PTI's success in 2018 may be attributed in large part to Khan's popularity, the Supreme Court's anti-corruption jurisprudence, and the military's efforts to manipulate the election in their favour. The new political system was sometimes referred to as a same-page regime since the elected, military, and judicial leadership were all on the same page about

69

crucial political matters. While the PTI was in power, the military's influence and authority expanded across all branches of government, and the democratic process regressed as the government cracked down on dissent and opposition. The Prime Minister, the Chief of Army Staff, and the Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence appeared to form a new troika in Pakistani politics (Saleem et al., 2021).

When judges were given the authority to rule against the democratically elected government and legislature, the military was content to let them do so. Some judges voluntarily joined the military in policing the other parts of government, but all judges were subject to the expanding authority of a more authoritarian presidency and its surveillance infrastructure (Litman, 2022). More and more people are aware of judges, making them more susceptible to attacks from executive agencies that may have material that might damage their careers and reputations. Because of executive pressure and the convergence of judicial and executive elites' interests, a sizable body of judges has been reticent to challenge the authority of the military.

Members of the PPP and PML-N, two opposition parties, spent a lot of time in court and behind bars while facing corruption allegations. With many judges under executive influence, the chance that a high court would maintain a detention order or deny a bail plea for an opposition member could nearly be anticipated by the strength of ties between the ruling leadership and that opposition party (Asif, 2021). (Asif, 2021). While the Supreme Court remained relatively reserved toward federal executive institutions throughout the PTI's administration, it often fought with the PPP's provincial government in Sindh Province. Even though the Eighteenth Amendment gave provinces more power and autonomy, federal bureaucracy and political elites who were opposed to the PPP used the superior court system to limit

70

what they could do in Sindh. During the epidemic especially, the Supreme Court rebuked the PPP's administration and issued concerns regarding the limitations of regional authority. Such communication from the court chipped away at provincial discretion in crucial policy areas (Waseem, 2022). (Waseem, 2022).

However, not all of the judges were so eager to accept autocracy. Opposition parties and dissenters used the Islamabad and Peshawar High Courts, which were governed by more independently minded chief justices, to push back against the worst abuses of governmental institutions. The Supreme Court was becoming more divided between judges who were prepared to side with the political and military leadership, and those who were not. The Justice Qazi Faez Isa case highlighted these schisms most starkly. A referral was filed with the Supreme Court to have Isa removed for alleged financial malfeasance after he became a target for his readiness to oppose military meddling in politics. While some judges concurred with the president and demanded responsibility, others sided with Isa and said the reference was an attempt to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Although Isa's supporters on the bench eventually managed to get the case against him dismissed, the polarisation that had been building up, as well as the growing fatigue among judges and lawyers due to the increasing autocratization, and the legitimacy crisis the court had created by enabling this autocracy, were now plain to see.

By 2021, tensions between Khan and the military leadership had grown, opening the door for the PTI's opponents to mount a serious challenge, which ultimately resulted in a vote of no confidence in Khan being cast by parliament in April of 2022. It was clear that the military was not on Khan's side when he tried to prevent that vote from happening, but there was still some uncertainty about

71

whether or not the numerous judges on the bench who had participated in judgements that helped bring the PTI to power would rule in favour of Khan's party. Khan's legal justifications for preventing the vote in Parliament were extremely poor, relying on arguments like charges of foreign plot, limits on the ability of the courts to intervene in legislative proceedings, and the supposed need to enable elections in the national interest. However, the tutelary court was unwilling to accept any restrictions on its power to meddle in parliamentary affairs (SIDDIQA, 2022). A finding in Khan's favour would have further eroded the court's authority with the legal community, especially as the foreign plot accusation remained unverified and there was general legal consensus that Khan's acts amounted to an attack on the constitutional order. Leaders in the bar and a number of judges petitioned the chief justice to take Khan's behaviour seriously. After the Supreme Court Bar Association recommended it, the court reopened at midnight on the night of the vote in an effort to force cooperation from a stubborn PTI. However, it was sufficient to persuade those who supported PTI of the bias of the judiciary.

The same-page hybrid could not have been created or dismantled without the tutelary position of the court and the concomitant political actions, which left the judiciary vulnerable to attacks on its authority and legitimacy.

CHAPTER 4

MEDIA AND ELECTORAL REFORMS

4.1 Media Role in Political

Advertising has been a crucial strategy for getting people's attention in order to market concepts, products, and services. It has earned a reputation as a crucial instrument for persuasion that deftly draws people in and shapes their beliefs in the right directions. We see a range of adverts in our daily lives covering various topics. In actuality, advertising are impersonal and organised presentations of concepts, products, and services made by a certain source via a particular communication medium (Arens & Schaefer, 2008). Simply said, advertising has an impact on our beliefs, feelings, and attitudes. Therefore, whether we want it or not, we need to be aware of how it functions and that it provides us with a wealth of information (Dyer, 1982).

Advertising is widely acknowledged to be present in every part of our life. Political parties also employ it as a weapon of persuasion to influence public opinion, beliefs, thought, and attitudes. Politicians frequently employ political advertising to sway the public's view in the desired direction. Political advertising is one of the most crucial aspects of political communication. During and after elections, numerous political parties frequently utilise political ads on a variety of communication platforms, from traditional media to social media. Election season is when political parties most usually work hard to win over voters using a variety of communication techniques, notably through media commercials (Norris et al., 1999). Due to its distinctive qualities of ubiquity, accumulation, and consonance, the media

73

has emerged as one of the key pillars of contemporary democracy.

Media is used by people to learn about candidates, the electoral process, and political party platforms (Norris, 2004). Political advertising is any kind of communication that opposes or supports a politician who is running for public office or nomination by a political party. (1986 Joslyn). Political advertising also includes any messages that criticise or promote a proposal, a political party, or a candidate for office. Similar to this, political advertising may also be characterised, except that it does so by promoting ideas as opposed to products. In order to influence voters, political parties in Pakistan also significantly rely on publicising their political viewpoints via a variety of media, particularly during election seasons. The primary goal of campaigns is to sway voters through political messages that inspire them and aid in the adoption of attitudes (Hovland & Janis, 1959). A voter can only be made aware of all the options and allowed to select the version he believes to be correct through political ads. 2002's Redlawsk. Voter solicitation used to be a laborious procedure, but political advertising has made it possible to reach voters instantly through media advertisements. Politicians now hire media managers to oversee their election campaigns, and all political parties have their own media wings.

The electoral history of Pakistan shows that political parties passionately take part in the elections and use their best resources to win. Political parties reach out to the public to promote their manifestos through the substance of political advertising and make every attempt to encourage them to vote for their political agenda in order to influence the electorate for their electoral success. Political parties in Pakistan currently employ these two well-liked platforms to spread the word about their

74

political agendas to the populace because political advertising is mostly distributed through print and electronic media. Political parties in Pakistan sold their agendas and manifestos through political advertising in order to sway voters' political views and behaviours during the general elections that were conducted in May 2013 and July 2018.

Mass communication has developed into a potent vehicle for economic, social, cultural, and political transformation (Figueras-Maz, 2013; Sihvonen, 2015). Information's prompt availability is more crucial than ever. Media outlets including TV, radio, newspapers, and the internet now have an impact on people's lifestyles, values, and opinions (Gamson, 2001). The information revolution has enhanced worldwide connectedness, awareness, and knowledge across all societal strata (Middaugh, 2017). Media coverage has a significant impact on how readers and viewers interpret news events and the key players involved (Ryan, 2001). This is particularly obvious when media coverage emphasises widely covered and current topics, including social movements. Media technology has undergone a significant development, which is causing a continual flow of enormous amounts of information to the public. It has increased the likelihood that the people would be aware of politics in all spheres (Kroll-Smith, 2002).

The public's opinions and decision-making processes are significantly impacted by media coverage (West, 2005). The public may become more knowledgeable about the candidates as a consequence of exposure to political information, and their perspective on voting decisions may shift in response to the candidates' assessments (Kahn & Geer, 1994). The public can judge politicians' temperaments and ethical standards by watching them argue and fight on media

platforms. Detrimental leadership tactics might have a negative effect on the public's perception of the political process (Elenbaas, 2008). One poll conducted in the USA during the 1992 presidential campaign found that news magazines had a significant impact on how well political parties performed in the election (Chaffee, 1997). The studies, which were based on polls taken during the campaigns for the 1976 and 1980 US presidential elections, found nearly identical results (Chaffee & Tims, 1982; Patterson, 1980). Because of the media's focus on a small number of concerns, the general population believes that these issues are more significant than other issues (Shaw & McCombs, 1977).

Political campaigns and outcomes may be greatly influenced by political commercials aimed at young people (Quigley, 2006). Because they are less secure in their political beliefs than older, more learned individuals, youngsters are more easily persuaded to support political causes (Jennings & Niemi, 1981). They are anticipated to be more open to changing their attitudes in order to make political judgments (Sears, 1983). Using the USA elections of 2004 as an example, it can be shown that the youth was one of the presidential campaign's most targeted demographics (US Federal Election Commission, 2004). Political information's content and timeliness seem to be crucial in evoking the negative mindset of the younger people (Elenbaas, 2008). The importance of print media has not been significantly impacted by the development of technologies like the 24-hour news cycle through the internet, radio, and television (Quigley, 2006), which offers youth an easily accessible and reliable news source to recognise the national or regional political setup (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997). Political parties in Pakistan heavily rely on print media, particularly newspapers, during election campaigns with a significant emphasis on youth since

76

about 35% of registered voters in Pakistan are between the ages of 18 and 30, and 58% are between the ages of 18 and 40. (ECP, 2013). Due to a greater emphasis on the youthful voters in 2013, Pakistan's General Elections saw much more newspaper use in political campaigns than it did in 2008. Due to their larger readership, political parties primarily used the three Urdu dailies Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, and Express.

Recent studies have illuminated the connection between media and voting behaviour. Studies have augmented on theories of voter engagement and looked at how exposure to political advertisements affects voters' choices, political participation, and attitudes towards to the political system generally (Huber & Arceneaux, 2009). (Jackson, Mondak, & Huckfeldt, 2009). Prior to the 2016 US Presidential Election, Halle (2016) examined the content of political advertising and categorised them according to tone and subject (e.g. attack, advocacy and contrast). Similar to this, Alawode and Adesanya (2016) categorised the tone of political adverts that were produced in Nigeria before to the 2015 elections (e.g. harsh, subtle and friendly). In their analysis, this new research did not place a strong emphasis on young. Furthermore, this research focused mostly on descriptive analysis and did not go beyond categorising advertising. The opinions of political parties towards the participation of young in politics have not been recorded in any of the recent research.

4.1.1 Political Advertising Media

Approximately a third of Pakistan's registered voters are between the ages of 18 and 30, while nearly 60% are between the ages of 18 and 40. Political parties in the nation have been stressing the young in order to further their political agendas after realising the importance of youth in bringing about political change. To reach

77

young people, political parties mostly use print media. By using the General Elections of 2013 as an example, this study looked at the prominence given to youth by three mainstream political parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarian (PPPP), and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PML(N)), when they published political advertisements in top Urdu Dailies. The study examined the various sorts of material used in commercials and ranked the political parties according to their emphasis on young. The study also identified the justifications for political parties' use of youth-oriented content.

The new tools and techniques employed by politicians in their election campaigns, such as the usage of cell phone messaging and the web in the framework of political communication and image-building tactics, were the subject of research in this field of political advertising (marketing). The effects of and comparisons between internet-mediated and traditionally-mediated election campaigns advertising were the focus of (Druckman, 2010) and (Kaid L. L., Political advertising and details seeking: Comparing publicity via traditional and Internet channels, 2002) studies. Other researchers, such as (Mylona, 2008) and (Leppäniemi, 2010), attempted to find out which politicians and voters make greater use of more modern technology.

In their examination of the relationship between Pakistani politics, media, and youth in the general election of 2013, (Hussain, Sajid, & Jullandhry, 2018) looked at political advertising geared toward young people. The research concentrated on youth-focused political advertising released by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, and Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians before elections in three major Urdu Daily newspapers (Nawa-i-Waqt, Express, Jang).

78

Tehreek-e-Insaf ran the most advertising (41%), and Muslim League Nawaz produced the least advertisements with material geared toward young people.

(Clark & Fine, 2012) examined political advertising efforts in new media contexts and contrasted the results with earlier studies that employed print media stimuli to sway voter behaviour. Utilising the new decision-making knowledge (comparative political advertisement), political advertising within a campaign may be improved and made more successful by taking into account its impact on people who favour a certain candidate. In an experimental research, Patrick C. Meirick evaluated the cognitive reactions of viewers to comparative and unfavourable political commercials.

Meirick examined campaign advertising from the 2000 congress elections and discovered that comparison commercials offered more counterattacks than negative ones while also being less likely to elicit source derogations. Contradictory arguments that are more heavily comparative reflect the variations in information processing processes that advertising suggested. Comparative commercials provoked good emotion, source boosting, and support arguments and were seen more favourably than attack ads. According to (Pinkleton, 1997), politicians and election candidates spread unfavourable information by using a mix-strategy that avoids the negative connotations of "attack" advertisements.

4.2 Electoral reforms

4.2.1 Introduction

Elections that give individuals a legitimate chance to choose their representatives in a free and fair process are a state's obligation in a democratic

society. The entire election process is carried out within a legal and governmental framework. It is necessary for the institution or organisation charged with conducting free and fair elections to be independent, efficient, effective, and unbiased. It must make sure that the voting procedures adhere to state election rules that were written with the principles of the constitution in mind. Elections that are free and fair not only boost political and democratic systems but also ensure that the public has faith in democracy. In the moment, "electoral reforms" is a topic of intense debate between the opposition and the government in Pakistan at all venues.

In August 2017, the National Assembly enacted the Election Reforms Act 2017, which was seen as a significant accomplishment. Electronic voting machines (EVMs) and internet voting (I-Voting) for abroad Pakistanis were specified in Sections 103 and 94 of the new Act, however, and the ECP was given legal permission to test these technical innovations in the bye-elections (Bari, 2022). The Results Transmission System (RTS), a novel electronic method, was employed by the ECP to transmit the 2018 General Election results. Nearly all political parties criticised the failure of RTS for the delay in the announcement of election results while complaining about "irregularities" throughout the elections. According to the ECP, the RTS's flaw was a "technical malfunction" ("Elections Were Transparent," 2018). By the end of 2020, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-led Federal government and the opposition parties had sharply divergent views on how to use technology. These differences deepened after the Elections (Amendment) Act of 2021 and the Elections (Second Amendment) Act of 2021 were passed in a joint session of the Parliament, and they have since become even more pronounced since

80

the PTI government was overthrown in April 20. (Bari, 2022).

The PTI government (2018-2022) recommended roughly 50 broad amendments to the current Election Act 2017 (EA-2017) through a bill that was first introduced in 2020 and passed by the National Assembly; some of these drew scathing criticism from the opposition and even the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The most significant of these are the right to vote for overseas Pakistanis, the use of EVM, the delineation of constituencies, the creation of electoral rolls, the correction of electoral rolls, the registration of political parties, the inclusion of 20 percent women in the necessary list of members for enlisting political parties, and the inclusion of marginalised class in elections in 2017. These recommendations covered a wide range of amendments to the EA-2017. However, the general election's usage of EVM and I-Voting garnered the most excitement, controversy, and press. Additionally, this sparked the opposition's vehement and severe condemnation as well as ECP's worries (Mehboob, 2021a). However, the PTI administration adopted the position that the submitted suggestions shall be carried out at any costs (Khan & Ansari, 2022).

4.2.2 Electoral reform concept

The phrase "increasing the responsiveness of election procedures to popular aspirations and expectations" refers to the broad notion of electoral reform (Electoral Management, n.d.). Politicians are nearly always involved in electoral reform procedures, and the majority of changes are imposed by the elite. It is necessary to emphasise here two different sorts of change that elites impose. Politicians want the voting system that will benefit them in elite majority imposition (Renwick, 2011), where an electoral system is a collection of regulations controlling

81

an election (Electoral Management, n.d.). Politicians modify the election system by bargaining through elite bargaining, but these politicians are largely motivated by self -interest (Renwick, 2011).

Election changes are the result of discussions between incumbents and the opposition, each of whom wants to increase their share of seats. Therefore, electoral changes are more likely when a political party or coalition hopes to increase its representation in the legislature by altering the electoral process. The electoral system is a "product of party politics" and is founded on three tenets: political parties are the main actors in electoral systems; parties are each "unitary actors"; and parties all want to win elections and gain more seats (Dez, 2001).

Political parties push for electoral reforms so because current system doesn't provide free and fair elections or leads to disputes over contested elections. Election changes in Pakistan were brought about by a lack of confidence, transparency, and competency in the electoral process and institutions, which led to contested elections. The dominant parties, PTI, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Faction (PML-N), and Pakistan People's Party (PPP), are all "organizationally weak," and Pakistan's powerful establishment, notably the military, has historically moulded party politics through periodic and selective co-option. The military-bureaucracy connection is asserted to be a "permanent element" of party politics, determining the objectives and strategies of parties, even manipulating elections and media. An expert describes Pakistan as an "establishmentarian" democracy in this regard (Waseem, 2020, p. 272).

It is clear from a review of the literature and the federal administration's

82

suggested amendments to the Election Act 2017 itself that the government and opposition are deeply divided. These suggested changes are met with severe objections by the ECP, who believes that some of them may jeopardise its constitutional standing. According to the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), attempts to change the Election Act 2017 "without a bigger political consensus will call into doubt the legitimacy of coming elections" and "may potentially reverse the trend of democratic consolidation in Pakistan" ("FAFEN Warns," 2021).

4.3 Election Commission of Pakistan

The establishment of a "permanent Election Commission" is mandated by Article 218 (1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and is done "for the purpose of election to both houses of Parliament, provincial assemblies, and for election to such other public offices as might be indicated by law." According to Clauses (2A) and (2B) of Article 213 of the Constitution, the Commission's responsibility is to "plan and conduct elections" for the National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies, the Senate, and municipal governments "honestly, justly, fairly, and in conformity with law." The Election Commission is also responsible for preparing electoral records and rules regarding a candidate's residency in the constituency, protecting against corrupt practises and political intervention in elections, and making election laws with the assent of the President of Pakistan (Article 220 of the Constitution).

The Chief Election Commissioner and four Commissioners make up the Election Commission. The executive branches of the federal government and the provinces are required under the constitution to support the Election Commission in carrying out its duties. The Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition in the

National Assembly discuss each other before appointing the Chief Election Commissioner, who serves a five-year term in office (Election Commission of Pakistan, n.d.). The Chief Election Commissioner must be a retired judge, bureaucrat, or technocrat, according to the constitution. (Saeed and others, 2021).

There have been 12 elections held in Pakistan so far, from 1962 to 2018. Elections were not held over the first 15 years. The first election was conducted in 1962, and the next eleven elections were held in the following years, respectively: 1965, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008, 2013, and 2018. The fairest elections in Pakistan are thought to have taken place in 1970. Unfortunately, every previous election was marred by scandal of some kind (Richter, 2019).

4.3.1 Election Reforms before 2018

The PML-N administration made the decision to start the election reform process in 2014. A Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms (PCER) was established with 34 members from all parliamentary parties, and it was presided over by the former Finance Minister Mr. Ishaq Dar. The PCER provided the Parliament with two interim reports in May and December of last year (Ali, 2016). The first study recommended amending the constitution to allow for the creation of a new election commission, and the second report, together with the draught Election Bill for 2017, recommended consolidating the key laws regulating Pakistani elections into a single Act. The election bill was tabled on August 7, 2017, and the Pakistani president signed it on October 2 to make it law (Rehman, 2017).

The Election Act of 2017 consolidated eight distinct election laws and granted the Election Commission independence. Additionally, EA-2017 changed the system

for financing political campaigns and voter registration. For contending candidates, political parties, security staff, journalists, and observers, the ECP published norms of conduct. According to the proposed legislation, people who get a Computerized Notional Identity Card (CNIC) from the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) are automatically registered to vote. The Act also contains provisions that would allow the Election Commission to carry out a pilot project for the use of EVMs, biometric verification, and I-Voting by Pakistanis living abroad (Khan & Ansari, 2022).

This law rationalised the election's maximum costs. For elections to the Senate, National Assembly, and Provincial Assembly, the new cap on spending is 1.5 million rupees, 4 million rupees, and 2 million rupees, respectively. According to the Act, the caretaker government's responsibilities are limited to daily operations so that it cannot in any way sway the results of the elections. According to the 2017 "Election Bill," political parties have to give women candidates at least 5% of the general seat ballots.

The law also included provisions for the delineation of constituencies following each census, a quick system for resolving disputes, special provisions for the registration of women and non-Muslims, transgender people, postal ballots for the disabled, and the installation of security cameras in polling places. The ECP is also permitted to request the assistance of any organisation to look into discrepancies in asset information. According to the 2017 "Electoral Reforms Bill," the ECP now has the authority to build up an open "Results Management System" for quick counting, compilation, and distribution of the election results.

4.3.2 Electoral Reforms after 2018

Elections in Pakistan have historically been contentious because of accusations and denials of vote-stealing, vote-rigging, and other irregularities. Always, the losers complain about unfairness and claim that the winners tampered with the outcomes. Along the way, additional institutions come under fire for interfering in favour of one specific party. In an effort to solve the problems, successive administrations have attempted to enact election changes, but sadly, they have largely failed. There will be no exemption in the 2018 elections. Since then, opposition parties have referred to the current administration as "chosen" rather than "elected."

To close the existing gaps and guarantee openness in the next elections, the PTI administration attempted to include significant electoral changes into the Elections Act 2017. However, several of these plans drew the worst condemnation from the ECP as well as the opposition parties. The current Amended Election Act of 2017 has been subject to a total of 49 suggested modifications. Some of these initiatives will have significant financial and legal ramifications. The following modifications are highlighted that have sparked discussion, controversy, and enthusiasm among the numerous stakeholders (Government Unveils," 2021; Yazdani, 2021):

i. "Article 226 of the Constitution shall be changed to provide for open voting in Senate elections."

ii. Section 11(2) allows the Election Commissioner broader budgetary latitude.

iii. Sections (17 and 20) of the Constitution allow for the delineation of seats based

86

on the number of registered voters rather than population.

iv. Section 21(5) elaborates that anybody who feels they have been wronged by the delimitation list may appeal to the Supreme Court.

v. That the sections of the law dealing with the creation and upkeep of electoral rolls by the ECP, 24, 26, 28, 34, 36, 42, and 44, be deleted.

vi. According to Section 25, the registration of NADRA ID data and the electoral roll would be same.

vii. Section 53 states that officials must be beyond the particular constituency's or tehsil's geographical authority in order to be designated as poll workers in such areas.

viii. Section 61 permits an increase in the nomination fee for candidates for the National Assembly from Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 50,000 and for candidates for the Provincial Assembly from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 30,000.

ix. Section 72 (A) mentions the seat of a returning candidate being forfeited if the oath is not taken within 60 days of the first sitting.

x. Section 76 (1) deals with the employment of a single poll worker for a polling place rather than a voting place.

xi. Section 94 empowers the ECP to protect abroad Pakistanis' right to vote.

xii. The use of electronic voting machines in elections is covered under Section 103.

xiii. Section 202 deals with the registration of political parties using a membership basis of 10,000 members (instead of 2000), with 20% of women.

xiv. Section 213 (A) of the Constitution establishes an annual convention for political parties.

4.3.3 PTI-Government Stance on Electoral Reforms

Regarding two changes, the right of abroad Pakistanis to vote electronically in EA-2017 and the use of EVMs in coming elections, the opposition and the government have repeatedly maintained very divergent viewpoints. For the next election, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-led administration (2018–2022) insisted on using EVMs in order to prevent the chance of rigging. The PTI's Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Mr. Fawad Chaudhary, claims that allowing the use of electronic voting machines (EVMs) in elections will be the first and most significant reform in Pakistani history, in keeping with Imran Khan's vision while he was Prime Minister. On May 19, 2021, Mr. Fawad Chaudhry and Mr. Babar Awan, the Prime Minister's Adviser on Parliamentary Affairs, unveiled the EVM prototype at the Parliament House in Islamabad. However, a top ECP official said that the Premier had been given an "unreliable" EVM that was nine years old (Mohammad, 2021).

Similarly, one of the long-standing requests of the expat community was to grant voting rights to Pakistanis living abroad. The government believed that political parties should demonstrate democracy, thus all political parties are obligated to have yearly conventions and give their members a chance to voice their opinions in an open forum at those gatherings. According to Mr. Babar Awan, the PTI administration "carried the torch of electoral changes in the election process" after taking office (Government Proposes, 2021). Additionally, the government demanded open voting for Senate elections and declared that the constitution will be changed to reflect this (Giné & Mansuri, 2018).

4.3.4 Opposition Political Parties' Stance

The deployment of EVMs in the next election was vigorously opposed by both mainstream opposition political parties. EVMs were described as "evil and cruel machines" by Shehbaz Sharif, the PML-then N's leader of the opposition (Mehboob, 2021). According to Marriyum Aurangzeb, the PML-information N's secretary, her party has opposed testing the device "behind closed doors without even any consultation with the opposition" (Government, Opposition, 2021). The modifications were also rejected by the Pakistan People's Party. PPP senator Sherry Rehman charged the administration with attempting to lay the groundwork for pre-election manipulation (Khan, 2021b).

The freedom of abroad Pakistanis to vote was controversial, according to both main political parties. Zubair Ahmad, a former governor of Sindh and member of the PML-N, questioned how political parties could connect with Pakistanis living abroad given their dispersed location. He also questioned the process for holding elections for Pakistanis living abroad and the selection of presiding officers and poll workers. Maulana Abdul Akbar Chitrali of Jamaat-e-Islami disagreed with the legislation as well (NA Amends, 2022).

The PML-N also criticised the idea of drawing electoral boundaries based on registered voters rather than population since it went against the letter of Article 51 of the Constitution. The delineation of seats based on registered voters, according to Mr. Zahid Hamid of the PML-N, would produce inequities since it will be unbalanced in favour of overpopulated metropolitan regions. He said that the ECP should continue to have sole authority over the RTS. Installation of video cameras and the presence of security personnel outside polling places should strengthen polling

89

place security. He asserted that in order for election changes to restore public and political party confidence, political agreement is required (Mahmood & Chawala, 2021).

4.3.5 The ECP Concerns over Electoral Reforms

The ECP has expressed grave concerns over the Election Act 2021 and has determined that several of the bill's provisions may weaken its constitutional mandate. Here are a some of the ECP's important observations: A. Appropriate legislation must be passed by the Parliament in order to address several practical concerns of granting overseas Pakistanis the right to vote, such as the issue of whether they should have distinct seats in the National Assembly and the type of voting process needed. b. ECP raised important concerns about EVM, including I whether EVM would be capable of holding free and fair elections, (ii) whether it could operate in different types of weather and load shedding, (iii) how transparency, secrecy, and accuracy would be guaranteed, and (iv) whether ECP would be able to hold free and transparent elections without proper testing.

c. The ECP vehemently opposed the delineation of constituencies predicated on registered votes rather than population because I it violates the letter of Article 51(5) of the Constitution, which requires delimitation on the basis of population, and (ii) it will increase the number of seats in cities because of people's tendency to move around. d. The ECP states that it would not accept the removal of specific provisions from the EA-2017 and the delegation of the duty of creating the electoral roll to NADRA since the latter is a body that is controlled by the Federal government and not an independent one.

90

e. According to the Election Commission of Pakistan, registration of voters is the sole responsibility of the ECP under Article 219, and the proposed amendments, under which the electoral roll will be identical to registration identification data of NADRA, will result in the transfer of registration authority to NADRA (Hussain, 2021).

f. The ECP claims that the proposed modifications provide NADRA authority to modify the electoral roll, despite the fact that it is the election commission's constitutional duty to make any necessary corrections to the rolls as and when necessary (Khawaja & Hasan 2016).

g.

The amendment that raises the threshold for a political party's enrolment from 2000 to 10,000 members is also opposed by the ECP. It asserts that although freedom of association should be maintained, parties operating in less populous regions and smaller provinces may not be able to collect these statistics, which would be unfair (Hussain, 2021).

h.

ECP put out four possibilities for voting from abroad: online voting, postal balloting, online voting at Pakistani embassies abroad, and postal e-voting. Also suggested were special seats and a separate electoral college for Pakistanis living abroad (Dilshad, 2022).

The Election Commission encourages the use of technology, but it "must be safeguarded and tested," according to ECP Special Secretary Zafar Iqbal Hussain. "EVM must not be introduced in undue haste," he said. According to ECP, EVMs were unable to stop poor voter turnout, especially low voter turnout among women, the

91

extensive use of political and electoral violence, the exploitation of state resources and power, buying votes, electronic ballot stuffing, law and order issues, and biased polling staff (Khan,2021a).

4.4 Elections (Amendment) Act 2022

After taking office in April 2022, the coalition government led by the PML-N introduced two amendments to the Elections (Amendment) Act 2022 to reinstate the Elections Act 2017, eliminating the use of EVMs and effectively prohibiting Pakistanis living abroad from voting in the upcoming general elections ("NA Amends," 2022). Employing the excuse that the ECP "faces technological problems to commence upon holding elections as per revised provisions" in EA-2021 for using I-voting and EVMs, the National Assembly enacted the Elections (Amendment) Act 2022 on May 26. (Electoral Reforms, 2022) The Bill suggested "doing further pilot projects before implementing I-voting and EVMs in general elections."

The use of EVMs without pilot projects, according to PML-N Minister for Law and Justice Senator Azam Nazeer Tarar, is a significant "risk" because it calls for increased funding and training for thousands of election officials, as well as reliable internet and electricity supply in various Pakistani regions ("NA Amends," 2022). Regarding the right to vote for Pakistanis living abroad, Mr. Tarar said that "the government sought active engagement of overseas Pakistanis" and that it was thinking about a plan to grant them representation by having them run for office utilizing party platforms (Electoral Reforms, 2022).

The discrepancies between the PTI as well as other political parties, according to FAFEN, would be detrimental to democratic traditions and practises. To

92

enact laws in 2021 without any National Assembly debate was against political convention. It was also noted that despite political polarisation, EA-2017 was approved after extensive debate and consideration for over three years. Additionally, FAFEN noted that although Election Act 2021 contains a number of significant and obvious improvements, political discourse has mostly concentrated on EVM and abroad Pakistani voters.

Through evasive legislation, the government and political parties should not abdicate their duty to the ECP. Engaging in disputes will make future elections and their results less credible. Additionally, it was noted that unwarranted criticism of the ECP for expressing an independent viewpoint in accordance with Article 218(3) of the constitution amounts to disdain for the document. Concern also emerges about the PTI government's strong drive for the deployment of EVMs and overseas voting without proper law, which creates significant concerns (Rahman et al., 2021). Political agreement, according to the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), is essential for changes (PILDAT Panel Discussion, 2021).

The resolution to advance the Elections (Second Amendment) Act, 2021 received 221 votes in favour and 203 votes against, according to Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, President of PILDAT, "indicates a severe rift not only in parliament but also in society" (Mehboob, 2021). Mr. Sarwar Bari, the national coordinator of the Pattan Development Organization, described the politics of I-voting as being based on "who would gain most from its use?" By offering foreign Pakistanis the option of I-voting, PTI hopes to convert their support into a voter base. In contrast, the coalition government led by the PML-N "wants to deny PTI of this advantage" for the same

reason (Bari, 2022).

4.5 Future of Democracy in Pakistan

Political parties operate in Pakistan as "contenders of power" in a democracy that is in full swing. Without political parties, there is no democracy (Waseem, 2020, p. 272). Elections that are flawed threaten democratic principles and political parties in addition to civil administrations. With the exception of the elections in 1970, none of the 12 elections held so far have been deemed free and fair. After every election, there was intense controversy. Allegations of rigging, election process manipulation, vote-stealing, election engineering, and Election Commission role questions have been made. The lack of a free and fair election process, along with other Patan reasons, is to blame for Pakistan's democracy's deterioration since it gives non-democratic entities the opportunity to meddle in and control the electoral process. Lack of a free and fair election process not only damages democratic culture and political institutions, but also erodes public faith. According to The Economist's Democracy Index for 2021, Pakistan was categorised as a "hybrid government" and ranked 104th out of 167 countries.

It received a 5.67 rating in the categories of electoral process and pluralism, 3.33 for political engagement, 5.36 for governmental operation, and 2.50 for political culture (Piracha, 2022).

The fair election process, which gives individuals a fair chance to choose their representatives without intimidation and boosts their faith in the electoral system, is essential to the continuation of democracy. Election fraud and manipulation by non-political entities are completely eliminated by a fair election process. In reality, the

transfer of power through free and fair elections would aid in the establishment of democracy after the restoration to civilian administration in 2008. The Parliament must be given the opportunity to thoroughly consider the strengthening of the Election Commission and fair electoral reforms with input from all significant political parties, the ECP, civil society, and election observers. The ECP should be reinforced so that it can carry out its judgments on the conduct and regulation of elections. By eliminating the idea of "hybrid" or "establishmentarian" democracy, one free election will pave the way for true democracy. In this context, political parties' maturity, especially that of their leaders, and their proactive stance in favour of the advancement of democratic culture and the democratic resolution of political disputes will be crucial factors.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Weakness and Strengthen

According to PILDAT's analysis of the condition and quality of democracy in 2017, the following important areas have had an influence. Democracy's strengths and weaknesses in Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Compared to 2013, 2018 seems to be losing its lustre faster and faster. Since 2013, Pakistan's democracy has shown a rather turbulent tendency rather than a gradual shift toward development. Significant Weakness and Strength were seen to Pakistan's democracy in 2018, and the country's democratic struggles are only expected to deepen in the next year owing to a number of factors, including the General Election scheduled for August 2018.

1. A crucial moment for the democratic order: To the extent that the present democratic system can weather the inevitable shocks and disruptions that will occur over the next four months, democracy will emerge from this period stronger than ever. Democracy might fail and plunge the country into a serious crisis if street unrest further undermines constitutional framework. As we enter an election year, political divisiveness has reached unprecedented

96

heights. If the animosity and battle of words not managed, it may escalate to violence during the campaign.

2. Although democracy in Pakistan has been in effect since 2017, its strength looks to be waning.

3. Third, the amount of room left for civilians in the realm of policy is decreasing, as the military expands its overreach into more and more areas outside of its traditional purview and elected governments and political leadership give ground. Civil-Military relations seem to be touching low water mark as tension between military establishment and a popular political party is spilling out in the public. After an extended period of inactivity, the National Security Committee (NSC) resumed holding regular meetings. As well as ordinary operational topics, the conference should address long-term, strategic challenges in civil-military relations.

4. Executive inertia and a lack of speed in making decisions: Federal and, especially, provincial decision-making remained excruciatingly sluggish and listless. Not only were key jobs not filled in a timely manner, but also critical policy choices were put on hold indefinitely until circumstances or court orders compelled them to be made. It has been difficult for the government to make decisions on issues such as the mainstreaming of FATA, the appointment of a full-time foreign minister, and the appointment of a full-time finance minister after Mr. Ishaq Dar became dysfunctional due to court cases and later indisposition.

5. Faizabad The events of Dharna and their aftermath have brought up important considerations that might have far-reaching effects for the stability of the State. All Pakistanis have a responsibility to their country to not only ask but also actively participate in the search for appropriate solutions to these issues. Every aspect of domestic democratic government is laid forth in the Constitution. There can't be multiple power centres, dharnas, or a weakening of the writ any longer; they all need to be eliminated. 6. The National Action Plan and the Fight Against Terrorism The armed forces deserve the highest national gratitude for their supreme sacrifices in stemming the tide of terrorism, but the incidents in 2017 show that this respite is temporary.

6. Election Law Changes 7 Political parties have been shown to lack the internal policy cohesion and timely focus on national issues that is necessary to effectively govern. Electoral reforms have not received the necessary attention and focus due to the slow and careless passage of the Elections Act, 2017, which has some deliberate reversal of earlier important gains and the delay in passage of the 24th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2017. Regardless of this setback, Pakistan is more ready than ever to hold a fair and transparent 11th General Election in 2018.

7. Internal democracy of Political parties, already severely weak, fell further throughout 2017 as the parties bravely experimenting with true party elections also succumbed to the dominant pattern of election only for the sake of satisfying a legal formality.

98

8. As was the case in previous years, Parliament and Provincial Assemblies failed in 2017 to overcome political and institutional challenges. Attendance in legislative sessions is consistently well below the 25% threshold, sometimes resulting in early adjournments and even prorogations, demonstrating a lack of respect on the part of both members and senior political leaders. There was a lack of effective executive supervision from both Parliament and the provincial assemblies and their committees. The Supreme Court was able to hold the government responsible for this blunder.

9. During judicial proceedings, the judiciary has made a number of unwarranted comments that have been harmful to the cause of justice. 10 The judiciary appears to have caved to populist pressures and street sentiments. There are still many unresolved concerns about the composition of the JIT and other novel actions taken in the Panama case. While the judiciary is preoccupied with high-profile political issues and things pertaining to the executive domain, a massive backlog of cases persists and a broken system of justice continues with no improvements in sight. Popular political parties are openly attacking recent decisions made by the superior court, which looks to be eroding public faith in the judiciary and prompting the judiciary to publicly defend itself to an unusual degree. It will be up to the higher courts to strictly enforce their own code of behaviour and protect their reputation.

10. The media and social media in Pakistan have pushed political polarisation to unprecedented heights. Social media has become a new tool for manipulating public opinion as both political parties and non-governmental organisations

99

employ large social media operations to shape public discourse. There are grave worries that organised organisations or foreign forces may use social media to try to influence the forthcoming General Election.

5.2 Factors of weakness and strength democracy

1. The condition of Civil-Military ties in Pakistan remains to be the largest stumbling barrier to establishment of democracy in Pakistan. While the relations have never matched the meaning of the Constitution and consequently have never been perfect, changes in 2017 have posed more crucial hurdles for Pakistan's growth and democratic future.

2. Critical obstacles to Pakistan's democracy emerged after the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared Mr. Nawaz Sharif, who had been elected prime minister on June 1, 2013, ineligible for office because he was "not honest" according to Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The 6-member 'Joint Investigation Team-JIT' which presented a report to the Supreme Court based on which the Court reached its verdict includes two serving military officials from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) (MI).

3. Political parties have, time and again, proved that they lack internal policy consistency and the needed emphasis on national concerns for timely action. The needless delay and negligent adoption of Elections Act, 2017, which contains some purposeful reversal of prior key accomplishments, further revealed the lack of focus of both the Government and the parties on crucial concerns of electoral reforms in Pakistan.

4. Despite the delay and inactivity by the Parliament, the Election of Commission of Pakistan continues to modify its operations in the light of the flaws mentioned by the General Election 2013 Inquiry Commission in its report issued in 2015. The ECP in 2017, then, is in a better position to organise more professionally managed 11th General Election than the 10th General Election held in 2013.

5. However, given the tendencies of certain political forces that prefer to doubt any lawful procedure if it doesn't reach their desired outcomes, black clouds seem to be hanging over the holding and acceptance of the results of the next General Election.

6. Following Mr. Nawaz Sharif's disqualification in July 2018, the Parliament enacted the Election Bill 2017, which abolished the legal prohibition on someone serving as an office-bearer of a political party if they are either ineligible for or disqualified from being elected as a member of parliament under Article 63 of the Constitution. This opened the door for Mr. Sharif to be re-elected as the leader of the PML-N following his expulsion.

7. Huge backlog of cases exist and a broken system of justice persists with no improvements in sight while judiciary keeps engaged with high profile political issues and problems belonging to executive domain. As popular political parties conduct open assault on recent decisions of the superior court, public faith in judiciary looks to be waning and judiciary seems to be making extraordinary efforts to openly defend itself. Superior courts will be required

to enforce their own code of conduct more strictly and preserve their prestige more vigilantly.

8. Perhaps the largest difficulty of the media in Pakistan is its quickly disappearing dependence on verified and investigated facts and instead an almost obvious usage of views disguised up as analysis. As a result, rumour, conspiracy theories, brazen mudslinging and personal attacks have taken centre stage on the news media platforms. There are, of course, a few significant outliers, which continue to adhere to strong standards of journalism despite the great odds.

9. There have been rising reports, which still lack strong evidence, of foreign money being used to manipulate the content of electronic media both in the news and entertainment. While legislation of the nation plainly and clearly bans foreign funding to media, the reports need to be properly explored. Any foreign funding utilised directly or indirectly in influencing the digital content one way or the other should be properly dealt with according to the law.

5.3 Conclusion

However, there are indications that the platform of consistent industrialization is effectively built for the democracy, and that there is the potential for the production of instant economic damage if a transition from authoritarianism to democracy is discovered, as a result of the people's comprehensible desire to increase the economic gain that political legitimacy brings in its coaching, which may be an auctioned political approach to refined modern industrial economy. The

102

role that foreign influence plays in the democratisation process is complex, ranging from overt pressure on the issue of democracy to the concealment of entrenched interests.

According to the debate above, Pakistan's civil bureaucracy is "strong" and "over-developed" in comparison to the country's elected and represented institutions. The strength of the civilian bureaucracy is a result of factors such as colonial legacies, centralised institutional structures, superiority complexes, technical know-how, and political rivalries. These factors enable the civilian bureaucracy to thwart any reforms that threaten their authority, status, and reputation. Additionally, Pakistani public workers follow the traditional bureaucratic approach since it safeguards their colonial-inherited authority and prestige. A stable Westminster or parliamentary style of government also poses a danger to the benefits and privileges associated with Pakistan's civil service structure. As a result, Pakistan was unable to construct a stable and functional parliamentary system from 1988 to 2019 because public workers saw threats to the status quo as being historically entrenched. The debate explains Alavi's "over-developed" state structure, which promotes Westminster-style parliamentary government at the price of the civil servants' continued dominance in Pakistani culture.

The first research question asked, "Why does a political party in Pakistan, the PTI, with within-system objectives and a sizable interest in the political system, participate in legislative activity that threatens to topple that exact system?" The PTI has institutional incentives to instigate a crisis significant enough to prompt military involvement and to give the impression that it is in difficulty in order to persuade local political leaders to resign from the ruling party, which is the solution to this

103

issue. The comparison with PPP in opposition demonstrated that it responded to these structural incentives in the same way when it was in opposition in the 1990s; but, starting in 2013, it ceased responding to them in the current time. A quick overview of the PML-time N's in opposition from 2008 to 2013 uncovered a similar trend of the largest opposition group staying away from legislative action that would endanger the stability of the democratic system. The characteristic that shone out in each of these parties was their past experience in managing the central government, and it appeared that this experience was what motivated them to uphold democratically appropriate oppositional boundaries in the future.

This was shown by the fact that both of these parties signed the Charter of Democracy, pledging not to cross certain lines in opposition, including requesting military intervention. It was deduced that the PPP's opposition activity from 2013 to 2017 was a continuation of the identical rational self-interested party but with a larger, longer-term sense of that self-interest by comparing the PTI's behaviour to the PPP's behaviour in the 1990s. As a result, two hypotheses were created from the explanation for the research topic that was found in this study. According to the first hypothesis, if opposition parties have institutional incentives to participate in legislative activity, their prior experience managing the central government serves as an intervening variable and modifies party behaviour. The second premise of this case study is that the possibility of parliamentary action is increased by the brittleness of political allegiances and the reliance of party leadership on local political bosses.

The goal of this study was to serve as the catalyst for a theoretical discussion on the little-discussed phenomena of intra-system political parties holding legislative

104

protests. The population within each political parties is quite limited, as was noted at the outset of this study, therefore detailed comparative case studies will also be required for this research's continued development. Regarding the first hypothesis outlined in this study, it can be tested using the case of FIDESZ in Hungary to determine the causal mechanisms by which FIDESZ's behaviour was restrained in the years immediately before and after its government experience from 1998 to 2002 and how its parliamentary protest character later reappeared in opposition but in a more muted form compared to the pre-1990 dissident movement character. By demonstrating both how expecting that experience might change the party's parliamentary character and how experience in central government can limit party conduct, the instance of FIDESZ can further contribute to this theoretical discussion. Testing the first hypothesis in the context of the three political parties in Indonesia—the Democratic Party (PD) and the Prosperous Justice Party—provides another line of inquiry (PKS). PD had prior experience in central government, therefore a comparative case study of such three political parties can show whether or not it played a more restrained role in legislative demonstrations than the other two parties. In order to determine if the second hypothesis of this study has a strong explanatory value, it may also be taken into account in this comparative case study.

This study has added to the body of knowledge on social movements and political parties. Beyond only describing the origins of political parties or the success of social movements that may be made more likely via the organisational resources of political parties, it has filled the gap between the literature on political parties and social movements. It has demonstrated how some ideas may be used from social movement literature to more precisely describe political party protest behaviour.

105

This Study has produced a unique contribution in the shape of the face of party on the street by combining theory on disrupting action discovered in social movement literature with the structure of three faces of political parties developed by Katz and Mair (1993).

This face of the party offers a theoretical framework to understand the behaviour of within-system political parties when they engage in parliamentary protests and the costs related to that face in the absence of any coherent theory on understanding the behaviour of the party when it engages in such protests. The theoretical framework has been anchored in an empirical model and helped in its conceptualization by using the example of the PTI to illustrate how the theoretical description of the face of a party on the street is described in practise. Furthermore, this study has provided a lens through which party activity in Pakistan may be examined in its structural context by drawing on previous work on the politics of Pakistan. This Study used news reports to weave a narrative of the behaviour of the PTI, PPP, and briefly the PML-N to show how these parties have answered to growth and economic of parliamentary activity and, in the case of the latter two parties, explained the manner in which these parties have also shown agency through their experiential learning. Where existing published work was not accessible, particularly in the current period of electoral democracy in Pakistan that started in 2008, Finally, this study developed two hypotheses about political opposition participating in legislative action by extending the general implications of the causal process discovered through the case study.

REFERENCE

Abdullah, M. (2017)."Constitutional institutionalization and Democracy: Study of Pakistan from 2008-2013. PhD diss.

Ahmad, Z. A. (n.d). Democratization, Institutionalization and Constitution in Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era. American International Journal of Research in Huminities Arts, and Social Sciences, 1-10.

Akbar, M., Ahmad, S., Malik, M., & Akhtar, M. J. (2022). The dynastic elitist political parties in Pakistan: an analysis of the PML (N) and PPP manifestos. PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, 19(3), 849-858.

Alam, Muhammad. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Peshawar.

Alavi, H. (1972). The state in post-colonial societies Pakistan and Bangladesh. New Left Review (74), 59.

Ali, F. (2016, May 16). Apathy of electoral reform. Dawn. 2.Bari S. (2022, May 13). Electoral reforms —by the elites, for the elite. The Express Tribune.

Ali, M. (2019). The Politics of US Aid to Pakistan: Aid Allocation and Delivery from Truman to Trump: Routledge.

Asif, M., Khan, T. A., & Khan, M. F. (2021). ELECTORAL MALPRACTICES IN PAKISTAN: FACTS AND EVENTS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY. Pakistan Journal of International Affairs, 4(4).

Bachrach, P. (1967). The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Boston: Little Brown.

Bennett, C. (2010). Muslim women of power: Gender, politics and culture in Islam. A&C Black.

Bib, F. (2018). What is Democracy? Challenges for Democracy in Pakistan. Global Political Review (GPR), 3(1), 66 – 75.

Brass, P. R. (2019). Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan,

107

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal: Routledge.

Cesari, J. (2014). The awakening of Muslim democracy: Religion, modernity, and the state. Cambridge University Press.

Choudhury, G. W. (1990). Constitutional development in Pakistan (Vol. 40): Longman London.

Dicey, A. V. (2005). An Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution Lahore: Law Inn Publishers.

Díez, F. G. (2001). The emergence of electoral reforms in contemporary Latin America. Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (Barcelona).

Dilshad, K. M. (2021, July 6). Internet Voting: Opportunities and challenges for Pakistan. Global Village Space. https://www.globalvillagespace.com/internet-voting-opportunities-and-challenges-for-pakistan/

Election Commission of Pakistan. (n.d.). Overview of ECP. https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=21#:~:text=218.,in%20accordance%20with%20this%20Article

Election Bill 2017 salient features (2017, August 22). Times of Islamabad.

Elections were transparent, RTS fault was a 'technological failure': ECP spokesman. (2018, July 30). Dawn.

Electoral Management. (n.d.). The Electoral Knowledge Network. https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/elections-and-youth/the-case-of-ghana

Electoral reforms bill likely to be presented in current NA session. (2017, August 7). Dawn.

Electoral reforms: NA passes Elections (Amendment) Bill-2022. (2022, May 26). Daily Times.

FAFEN warns against electoral reforms sans consensus Election monitoring body identifies 'legal inadequacies' in bills. (2021, September 12). The

108

Express Tribune.

Fair, C. C. (2015). Democracy on the Leash in Pakistan. Pakistan's Enduring Challenges, 131.

Gabriel A. Almond, G. B. (2011). Comparative Politics Today; A World View. Pearson.

Giné, X., & Mansuri, G. (2018). Together we will: Experimental evidence on female voting behavior in Pakistan. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,10(1), 207-235.

Giunchi, E. A. (2014). Ethnic Strife and Democratization in Pakistan: Some observations on concepts, measurements and the importance of history.

González Le Saux, M. (2021). The Paradox of Apolitical Professionalism: The Bar Association and Political Repression in Chile, 1920s-1950s. American Journal of Legal History, 61(1), 56-89.

Govt proposes amending Section 94 of Elections Act. (2021, September 18). The Express Tribune.

Govt unveils 49-point electoral reforms. (2021, May 03). The Express Tribune.

Govt, opposition poles apart on EVM. (2021, August 10). The Express Tribune.

Haqqani, H. (2013). Islamists and democracy: Cautions from Pakistan. Journal of Democracy, 24(2), 5-14.

Harland, T., Hocken, C., Schröer, T., & Stich, V. (2022). Towards a Democratization of Data in the Context of Industry 4.0. Sci, 4(3), 29.

Hussain, F. (2021, June 16). ECP alarmed at 28 clauses of electoral reforms bill. Dawn.

Hussain, Muhammad. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Swat.

Ibrahim, M. (2013). Democratization in South Asia: A Case Study of India and Pakistan (1988- 1999). International Journal of Learning and Development, 1-21.

Ibrahim, M., & Musarrat, R. (2019). ENGLISH-APPRAISAL OF ISLAMIC

109

DEMOCRATIZATION IN ZIA UL-HAQ REGIME. The Scholar Islamic Academic Research Journal, 5(1), 32-48.

Ibrahim, M., & Mussarat, R. (2015). Electoral politics: A case study of Pakistan (1947-1985). Journal of Public Administration and Governance, 5(1), 80.

ICG Asia Report N°40. (2002). Pakistan: Transition to Democracy? ICG.

Iqbal, Sajid. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Peshawar.

Iqbal, Sarwar. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Nowshehra.

Jaffrelot, C. (2016). The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience. Haryana, India: Penguin.

Jalal, A. (1990). State of martial rule London: Cambridge University Press

Jureńczyk, Ł. (2022). Democratic Backsliding in Poland: The Importance of the Values of Liberal Democracy and the Rule of Law in Polish-American Relations. Historia i Polityka, (42 (49)), 97-116.

Karim, L. (2004). Democratizing Bangladesh: State, NGOs, and Militant Islam. Cultural Dynamics, 16(2-3), 291-318.

Keddie, N. R. (2012). Women in the Middle East: Past and present. Princeton University Press.

Khan, J., & Ansari, S. H. (2022). Conducting elections amid pandemics: Lessons learnt from the United States and a way forward for Pakistan. Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences,3(1), 187-203.

Khan, I. A. (2021b, September 25). Govt-opposition clash over EVMs reaches senate. Dawn.

Khan, D., & Akhtar, A. S. (2022). Transforming a praetorian polity: the political economy of democratization in Pakistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du development, 1-19.

Khan, I. (2021). Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan: An Analysis of PPP Government (2008- 2013). Global Regional Review, 36-49.

110

Khan, I. A. (2021a, September 8). ECP raises 37 objections to EVM introduction. Dawn.

Khawaja, A. S., & Hasan, J. (2016). Implementing biometric voting system in Pakistan: An analytical review. Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan,53(2),1-19.

Kronstadt, K. (2008). Pakistan's sheduled 2008 Elections: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress.

Kureshi, Y. (2021). Selective assertiveness and strategic deference: explaining judicial contestation of military prerogatives in Pakistan. Democratization, 28(3), 604-624.

Kureshi, Y. (2022). Seeking Supremacy: The Pursuit of Judicial Power in Pakistan. Cambridge University Press.

Litman, L., & Shaw, K. (2022). Textualism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Independent State Legislature Theory.

Mahmood, D. Z., & Chawala, M. I. (2021). Theory of separation of power: Balancing the civil military relations in Pakistan 2013-2018.South Asian Studies,35(1),131 –144.

Mehboob, A. B. (2021a, September 12). Other electoral reforms. Dawn.

Michalak, A. M. (2021). " I love judges, and I love courts:" Chief Justice William H. Taft and reform in the federal judiciary.

Mohammad, A. F. (2021, September 13). Impossibility of use of EVM and e-voting by Pakistani foreign expatriates in upcoming elections. https://pakistanlawyer.com/articles/story/impossibility-of-use-of-evm-and-e-voting-by-pakistani-foreign-expatriates-in-upcoming-elections#_ftnref5

Mohmand, S. K. (2019). Crafty Oligarchs, Savvy Voters: Democracy Under Inequality in Rural Pakistan (Vol. 8): Cambridge University Press.

Muhammad, Jan. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Peshawar.

Muhammad, Jan. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Peshawar.

Mustafa, G., Javed, A., & Arslan, M. (2019). Role of Pakistan People's Party in Democratization in Pakistan. Journal of Historical Studies, 61-83.

NA amends election laws to stop EVMs use. (2022, May 26). The Express Tribune.

Nasr, S. V. R. (2005). The Rise of" Muslim Democracy". Journal of Democracy, 16(2), 13-27.

Noman, O. (1990). Pakistan: A political and economic history since 1947: Routledge.

Pace, H. J. (2022). The Utility of Originalism in Mitigating Judicial Elite Bias: Evidence from the 2021-2022 Supreme Court Term. Available at SSRN 4259320.

Pakistan: 1992(pp. 19-41). Routledge.

PILDAT Panel Discussion. (2021, July 2). Political consensus is imperative for electoral reforms: PILDAT. https://pildat.org/electoral-reforms1/political-consensus-is-imperative-for-electoral-reforms-pildat-panel-discussion

Piracha, R. (2022, February 12). Pakistan ranked 104th among 167 nations on Democracy Index 2021. https://voicepk.net/2022/02/pakistan-ranked-104th-among-167-nations-on-democracy-index-2021/

Qadri, S., & Umer, N. (2015). Women Empowerment and Political Democratization in Pakistan with reference to General Parvez Musharraf Regime. Public Policy and Administration Research, 5(10).

Rafiq, A. (2022). Changing course: understanding judicial independence in Pakistan (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oxford).

Rahman, A. U., Ashraf, I., & Fatima, N. (2021). Implementing electronic voting system in Pakistan: Readiness, challenges and way forward. Global Pakistan Studies Research Review, IV(II), 19-31.

Rehman, D. (2017, October 3). What has actually changed in Election Reform Bill 2017? Daily Pakistan.

Renwick, A. (2011). Electoral reform in Europe since 1945. West European Politics, 34(3), 456-477.
112

Richter, W. L. (2019). The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan. In C. H. Kennedy (Ed.),

Rizwan Shehzad. (2021, May 10). Opp objects to expats voting right ordinance. The Express Tribune.

Rodrik, D. (2016). Is liberal democracy feasible in developing countries? Studies in Comparative International Development, 51(1), 50-59.

Sadiq, Ghulam. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Peshawar.

Saeed, N., Minhas, A. S., & Firdous, N. (2021). History of constitutionalism in Pakistan. Asian Social Sciences Review,2(2).

Saeed, Taqweem. 2020. Telephonic Interview/Discussion. Islamabad.

Saleem, M., Hanif, K., Khan, R. S. M., & Qazi, N. (2021). Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: A Case Study of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf from General Elections (2018) to Senate Election (2021). Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, 58(2), 247.

Salman, M. (2021). Changing nature of competition in the weak party system of hybrid regime in Pakistan.

Shabbir, S. (2009). The Role of Various Movements and Organizations to Defend the Pakistani Women's Rights and Measures Adopted by the Government. Journal of Gender and Social Issues, 8(2).

Shafqat, S. (2009). Pakistan: militancy, the transition to democracy and future relations with the United States. Journal of International Affairs, 63(1), 89-109.

Shah, A. S., Basit, A., & Azhar, M. M. (2016). Democratization in Pakistan: Role of Media in Civilian and Military Regimes. Global Regional Review, 2, 405-416.

Siddiqa, A. (2013). Discovering Democracy Five years of 'Political rule, JSTOR, 23-25.

SIDDIQA, A. (2022). Battling the Ballot: Military & Mullah versus the Political Class in Pakistan. アジア研究, 68(4), 32-46.

Sodaro, M. J. (2001). Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction. McGraw-Hill

113

Sohail, T., & Sohail, T. (2022). SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRUCTS OF DYNASTIC POLITICAL ELITES OF PAKISTAN. Pakistan Journal of Social Research, 4(2), 278-287.

Stepan, A., Linz, J. J., & Yadav, Y. (2011). Crafting state-nations: India and other multinational democracies. JHU Press.

Strauss, P. L. (2019). Eroding Checks on Presidential Authority-Norms, the Civil Service, and the Courts. Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 94, 581.

Sutil, J. C. (2019). The Judiciary and the Political System in Chile: The dilemmas of judicial independence during the transition to democracy. In Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary (pp. 89-106). Routledge.

Tudor, M. (2013). The promise of power: The origins of democracy in India and autocracy in Pakistan. Cambridge University Press.

Tudor, Maya, (2013) The Promise of Power the Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press, p.2.

Unger, R. M. (1987). Social theory: its situation and its task; 2, False necessity: anti-necessitarian social theory in the service of radical democracy; 3, Plasticity into power: comparative-historical studies on the institutional conditions of economic and military success (Vol. 1). CUP Archive.

Usman, A., Hassan, M., & Sial, A. (2022). Independence of Judiciary Leading Justice System to Injudicious Outline. Journal of Law & Social Studies (JLSS), 4(2), 233-246.

Waseem, M. (2020). Political Parties in an "establishmentarian Democracy." In Mariam M. et al. (Eds.), Pakistan's Political Parties: Surviving between Dictatorship and Democracy (pp. 272-281). Georgetown University Press.

Waseem, M. (2022). Political Conflict in Pakistan. Oxford University Press.

Weinbaum, Marvin G. (2007). Political Culture in Pakistan's Domestic and Foreign Policies, Pakistan Vision, Vol. 8, No.1, July 2007. p.18

Yazdani, F. (2021, June 23). Explainer: How proposed electoral reforms will impact

next general elections. Nayadaur. (https://nayadaur.tv/author/fauzia-yazdani/)

Zikria, G., & Ahmad, K. (2019). Democratic Political Development: A Case Study of Pakistan 2008- 2013. Pakistan Social Sciences Review, 254-266.

Zikria, G., Ahmad, K., & Qasim, G. (2019). Democratic Political Development: A Case Study of Pakistan 2008- 2013. Pakistan Social Sciences Review, 3(2), 254-266.